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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5733
This paper examines the potential role of civil society 
action in increasing state accountability for development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It further develops the analytical 
framework of the World Development Report 2004 
on accountability relationships, to emphasize the 
underlying political economy drivers of accountability 
and implications for how civil society is constituted and 
functions. It argues on this basis that the most important 
domain for improving accountability is through the 
political relations between citizens, civil society, and state 
leadership. The evidence broadly suggests that when 
higher-level political leadership provides sufficient or 
appropriate powers for citizen participation in holding 
This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part 
of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at skhemani@worldbank.org.  
within-state agencies or frontline providers accountable, 
there is frequently positive impact on outcomes. 
However, the big question remaining for such types 
of interventions is how to improve the incentives of 
higher-level leadership to pursue appropriate policy 
design and implementation. The paper argues that there 
is substantial scope for greater efforts in this domain, 
including through the support of external aid agencies. 
Such efforts and support should, however, build on 
existing political and civil society structures (rather than 
transplanting “best practice” initiatives from elsewhere), 
and be structured for careful monitoring and assessment 
of impact.Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Consider the following facts: 
 
  Teachers in public primary schools in Uganda are absent 20 percent of the 
time; when present, they are in class teaching 18 percent of the time 
(Chaudhury et al, 2006, World Bank, 2007). 
  Only 1 percent of non-salary expenditures allocated to primary health clinics 
in Chad actually reach the clinics (Gauthier and Wane, 2005). 
  There are huge leakages from fertilizer subsidies in Tanzania, with elected 
officials receiving 60 percent of the vouchers (Pan and Christiansen, 2011). 
  Efforts to hire workers below the minimum wage in South Africa—a country 
whose unemployment rate is 25 percent—are met with widespread, 
sometimes violent, protest. 
  Thanks to regulations that prohibit entry, monopoly rents to trucking 
companies cause Africa to have the highest transport prices in the world 
(Teranavithorn and Raballand, 2009). 
 
In addition to being emblematic of problems facing poor people in Africa, these facts 
have one more thing in common: they can be explained by failures of 
“accountability” at various points in the chain of relationships in the implementation 
of public sector policies. This chain goes from the preferences and needs of citizens, 
through the political process, and then passes to the bureaucracies and front-line 
actors charged with delivering services, or to the regulators, judges and others with 
responsibility for monitoring and enforcing economic and social behavior.  Teacher 
absenteeism or leakage of public funds are examples of politicians or central-level 
bureaucrats being unable (or unwilling) to hold lower-level bureaucrats and service 
providers accountable.  Capture of fertilizer subsidies or wage premiums by 
politically powerful groups are instances of citizens’ inability to hold politicians 
accountable.2 
 
An approach to improving state accountability through public action by civil society, 
that has long been advocated and practiced by local and international non-
governmental organizations, has more recently become of interest to the 
development financing community of bilateral and multilateral donors, including 
the World Bank. 
                                                        
2 It is important to note that these are not problems that can be solved by rolling back the state. For a 
wide range of goods and policies, the state has an important role to play in facilitating markets, 
growth poverty reduction, and human development. The concern is how to make the state more 
accountable for better development policies.   3 
 
Does a substantially strengthened role for civil society have a sound conceptual and 
empirical basis, or is it just another fad?  Where civil society influences state action, 
is it always in the direction of better provision of public goods, equitable human 
development and dynamic capitalist advance?  Or does civil society also reflect the 
inequalities in wealth, organization and influence in the political process? What is 
the relationship between civil society action to make the state work better for all 
citizens, and formal political and governmental mechanisms of accountability?  And 
even if there is a sound, substantiated case for some forms of strengthening of civil 
society, can external actors play a useful role in supporting it, or will they just add a 
new set of distortions? 
 
This paper seeks to provide answers to these questions, drawing on a structured 
review of the available literature and development experience in these areas.  First, 
it reviews the analytics of accountability relationships, linking the core 
accountability relationship to the broader political economy of African societies, the 
democratization process, and the potential role of civil society.  Second, against that 
analytical framework, the paper reviews the available evidence from current 
attempts to improve accountability through civil society-related interventions, 
focusing on empirically rigorous and carefully documented studies. The theme here 
is civil society action as a means to the pragmatic ends of development—growth, 
poverty reduction, health, education—rather than an objective in and of itself. 
 
The analytics and evidence support a common conclusion. There is indeed a strong 
prima facie case for a strengthened role for civil society, to differing degrees and 
forms in both democratic and at least semi-authoritarian regimes.  However, 
strategies and interventions in this regard need to be cognizant of underlying 
political economy drivers of failures in accountability. In political economy 
environments characterized by high degrees of clientelism and rent-seeking, such as 
are widespread in the Africa region, an unqualified faith in civil society as a force for 
good is more likely to be misplaced. The evidence base on the organization of civil 
society suggests that historic institutions of poverty and inequality, or of ethnic 
identity, can inhibit collective action in the broader public interest, promote more 
narrow sectarian interests, and nourish clientelist political competition. 
Furthermore, broad collective or public-interest action by civil society is heavily 
constrained by existing systems and institutions of the state. However, there is also 
substantial potential for civil society action to achieve success in addressing 
accountability failures, incremental and transformational, with the focus here on 
conditions under which incremental changes can emerge. 
   4 
What does this mean for domestic, and especially external, actors?  It implies that 
support for civil society should follow an approach that is both organic and 
experimental: organic in the sense that interventions contribute to change in 
existing political and societal structures, and not seek to bring “best practice” ideas 
from outside; experimental in the sense of that there be structured monitoring, 
information generation and evaluation in the process—with the techniques 
depending on the nature of the intervention. 
 
In the next section, we unbundle the different accountability relationships and 
explore how, depending on the nature of the “failure,” civil society action may or 
may not help.  The following section summarizes our review of the existing evidence 
on the impact of civil society related initiatives to improve accountability.  A final 
section discusses the implications for external actors. 
 
2.  The analytics of accountability and civil society action in a Sub-Saharan 
context 
 
2.1  The long and short routes of accountability 
 
The 2004 World Development Report (WDR), Making Services Work for Poor People, 
postulated that problems in the delivery of basic services—such as the teacher 
absenteeism, leakage of public funds or poorly targeted fertilizer subsidies 
described above—could be interpreted as breaks in the “long route of 
accountability.”  The argument was as follows.  In a private market transaction—
such as buying a sandwich from a vendor—there is direct accountability of the 
sandwich provider to the client or consumer.  The client pays the vendor directly; 
she can observe whether or not she received the sandwich; and, if the market is 
reasonably competitive, the client can go elsewhere if she doesn’t like the 
sandwich—and the vendor knows that.  The WDR called this relationship the “short 
route of accountability.” 
 
When public action is involved, the relationship between the client and the service 
provider is no longer a direct one, but an indirect one, intermediated by the state.  In 
the case of education, for instance, citizens as voters hold politicians accountable for 
allocating resources and regulating the education system.  In turn, politicians or 
policymakers hold teachers accountable for delivering the service.  This is the long 
route of accountability (Figure 1).  Viewed in this light, it is easy to see how service 
delivery failures can be interpreted as a breakdown in one or both of the links in the 
long route of accountability.   Teacher absenteeism is the result of policymakers’ 
inability (or unwillingness) to monitor teachers’ performance in the classroom.   5 
Even if they can monitor performance, they may not be able to enforce penalties for 
non-performance because of the nature of the contract between teachers and the 
state (most teachers’ salaries are fixed, independent of attendance). 
 
Figure 1: The Long and Short Routes of Accountability 
 
The state
Politicians Policymakers
Providers
Frontline organizations
Citizens/Clients
Organized Unorganized
Management Coalition/Inclusion Client Power
Long route of accountability
Short route
 
However, in the case of teacher absenteeism, there is the further question of how 
the contracts get determined in the first place, and why it is so difficult to change 
them, to make them more sensitive to performance.  The answer lies in the first link 
in the long route—the relationship between citizens and politicians.  Even if a 
majority of voters would prefer less absenteeism, there are significant failures in the 
political process that result in politicians who favor the status quo getting elected, 
and those attempting to address the problem of teacher accountability losing 
elections.  These political failures take on many forms, and in the case of education, 
there are some specific causes.  In many rural areas, teachers are also political 
organizers, so that politicians rely on them to deliver votes.  The South African 
Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), part of the governing coalition, is one of the 
most powerful trade unions in the country.  In the state legislature of the Indian 
state of Uttar Pradesh, teachers constitute 20 percent of the assembly in the early 
2000s, and former teachers another 20 percent (Kingdon and Muzammil, 2001). 
   6 
The relationships of accountability—the politics between citizens and policymakers, 
the compact between policymakers and providers, and the client power of citizens 
over providers—are determined by the behavior, incentives and organization of 
each set of actors in the “nodes”. There can be considerable heterogeneity within 
each of these nodes. Citizens can become organized as interest groups, to service the 
objectives of their group, even at the expense of broad public interest; formally 
unorganized citizens can demand broad public interest policies (or not) through the 
aggregate effect of their individual participation in elections. Politicians and 
providers (a variety of state agents) can similarly be heterogeneous in their 
motivations, incentives and organization, with some having more intrinsic 
motivation and stronger incentives for development objectives,  while that of others 
is inclined to extraction of private benefits.  
The central question of this paper is how citizen behavior, incentives and 
organization can be influenced to improve the functioning of politics, compact, and 
client power? How can citizen action contribute to the selection of better quality 
political and state agents, and strengthen incentives of all types of agents to deliver 
effective development policies?  
We re-interpret the WDR accountability triangle here by emphasizing the 
underlying political economy drivers of accountability. The politics between citizens 
and policymakers, previously characterized in the WDR 2004 as the “voice” 
relationship, is argued to be the more fundamental relationship of accountability in 
that it shapes the nature of the compact and client power. Civil society action can 
help to the degree that it can fix failures in political incentives for development 
policies; or in cases when the political leadership has incentives to use civil society 
input to address failures in the compact and client power. Even when political 
incentives allow interventions that enable civil society action to improve the 
compact and/or client power, the question has to be asked whether there are other 
mechanisms that political agents could have used to improve the performance of 
state agents and providers which rely less on citizen effort and time and more on 
political agent effort and time, or by reducing political rents.  
Accountability solutions, and associated failures, relate to three mechanisms, with 
strong complementarities between them: 
  Information 
  Collective action 
  Sanctions 
 
Political accountability failures could be attributed to asymmetric information about 
the performance of public policies; lack of coordination or collective action among 
citizens in evaluating politicians on the basis of broad public interest policies (as 
opposed to the basis of ethnic identity, or narrowly targeted clientelist transfers);   7 
and lack of effective sanctioning mechanisms such as through an independent 
election commission, that monitors free and fair elections.  
 
Weak compacts can be derived from weak politics, when policymakers do not use 
instruments at their disposal to address information constraints in monitoring 
providers or to strengthen organizational incentives and sanctioning mechanisms 
within public agencies. A highly committed senior education officer will be able to 
do little if teachers are hired as political patronage and not to teach; a mining official 
determined to meet citizen complaints of flouting environmental standards will not 
be tolerated if politicians are party to rent-sharing deals with the mining companies.  
However, even in cases where higher tier political authorities have incentives to 
reduce rent-seeking at lower levels, lack of information and managerial constraints 
on enforcing sanctions can lead to failures in the compact.  
 
Weak client power can also be derived from weak politics, such as when states 
provide weak grievance mechanisms (sanctions) and limit choice among providers 
through state policies.  Furthermore, very local institutions of inequality can make 
poor citizens powerless against local social and economic elite who can be the 
providers of most state and private services. That is, client power is hobbled by 
asymmetric information and institutional constraints to collective action and 
sanctions.  
 
Civil society action in Africa and elsewhere has focused on ways in which 
information provision and other activities mobilize citizens for collective action and 
demands for redress. These may be localized islands, where social pressures 
improve the performance of frontline providers.  Or there can be particular sectors 
or agencies that are effective and responsive, and use citizen inputs to monitor the 
performance of providers and sanction poor behaviors.  These islands of collective 
and effective action can be of great interest as to what can be done, and may be signs 
of potential for broader change.  But they can also be deceptive if they do not reflect 
overall political strategies, making scaling of development results (even if not the 
specific interventions) problematic.  
 
Civil society’s effectiveness will almost always depend on incentives, and in 
particular the activation of sanctioning mechanisms, within the state.  These may 
take the form of internal bureaucratic structures within implementing agencies, or 
formally independent institutions of accountability within the state, including the 
legislature, judiciary, auditing departments etc. In practice, however, such 
institutions are often either weak or not substantively independent.  The 
effectiveness of such internal mechanisms will depend on their being aligned with   8 
political strategies, especially over the medium to long term.  It is in this sense, that 
we regard the relationship of politics, that reflects underlying structures of power in 
a society, as being the primary influence on overall accountability relations. 
 
2.2 Political economy drivers of accountability relations 
 
Recent theoretical advances in understanding development, or the persistent lack of 
it, have emphasized the role of long-term institutions that continue to shape the 
current political economy of countries. Institutions are interpreted as products of 
long-term interactions among elite groups and between elites and middle and 
poorer groups (North et al, 2009; Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2005; Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1997; Rajan, 2009).  Important themes are of state formation as a response 
to the threat of violence between competing groups, and of institutional resolutions 
that often reflect the interests of elites, in environments of highly unequal 
distribution of endowments.  Institutional resolutions, involving “extractive” 
economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, Forthcoming) can be good for 
political and economic elites, while also sustaining inequalities and inhibiting the 
innovation, entry and investment that is necessary for long-term growth. Related 
strands examine the role of historical colonial institutions in creating or sustaining 
inequality, which then leads to persistence of elites and poor institutions that inhibit 
development (Acemoglu et al, 2001). 
 
Two kinds of rent-sharing arrangements are of importance to the functioning of the 
polity and the economy. 
 
First, there are bargains between competing elites, and between political and 
economic elites.  Effective bargains with strong incentives against reneging are 
necessary for overall political stability, since excluded elite groups will otherwise 
mobilize to topple rulers to capture the rents.  In particular a credible commitment 
by political elites not to expropriate economic elites is crucial to the investment and 
innovation that drive aggregate growth.3  In mature, consolidated democracies 
credible commitment against such expropriation is provided by the array of 
institutions that guarantee the rule of law, and protect businesses and individuals 
from opportunistic behavior of agents of the state.  Under authoritarian polities, 
political elites in control of the state also use force—despotic power4—to prevent 
                                                        
3 See Haber et al (2003) for a historically based development of this argument for Mexico in the 20th 
century. 
4 By despotic power, we mean the capacity of the state elite to coerce and dominate civil society 
classes, including other social and economic elites and middle and subordinate groups.  Mann (1986) 
contrasts this with “infrastructural power” that involves provision of public goods and services,   9 
competing groups from taking over the state.  However, for economic investment to 
occur, there must also be mechanisms that make it costly for the political elites to 
expropriate productive investments.  One mechanism is the mingling of political and 
economic elites by social, marital and cultural ties.5 
 
Sharing of rents among different elite groups is a pervasive institutional form in 
Africa (van de Walle, 2001).  Cote d’Ivoire is an example of a case in which the 
credible management of such a sharing system by then President Houphouet-Boigny 
was central to the country’s stability; this lost credibility and spilled over into 
conflict on his death (Azam, 2001).  In post-apartheid, democratic South Africa, the 
Black Economic Empowerment policy is effectively a mechanism to share rents with 
the emerging black elite (Andrews, 2008; Acemoglu et al, 2007). 
 
Second, there is rent-sharing with middle and poorer groups—that may include 
formal sector workers, slum-dwellers, large and small farmers, landless rural 
workers and so on—in return for their political support.  The extent to which this is 
necessary again depends on the nature and power of the regime: regimes with high 
levels of despotic power will be able to use repression to maintain order under 
conditions of high inequality and political or social exclusion.  However, this is 
sustainable only with substantial resources to maintain the repressive apparatus 
(including rent-sharing with the army and police).  Some redistribution is necessary 
to subordinate groups to avert social revolt even in authoritarian societies.  Under 
democratic auspices this is clearly even more relevant.  Moreover, where 
subordinate groups are sufficiently organized to threaten an authoritarian regime, a 
democratic transition will be demanded to ensure that any concessions (economic, 
social or political) are credible—otherwise the elites will have every incentive to 
reverse the concessions if they can restore their organizational capacity and 
associated despotic power.6 
 
These two sets of rent-sharing political arrangements provide the underlying 
structure to the politics relationship.   In each domain, the rent-sharing 
arrangements are functional to both the stability of the polity and to the economic 
investment and the expansion of employment and services.  But each also brings 
with it intrinsic state maladies—problematic aspects of state functioning with 
                                                                                                                                                                     
regulation of private activity and raising taxes over the whole of a nation’s territory; this intrinsically 
depends on the behavior of households, firms and civil society. 
5 Haber et al (2003) explore the systematic role of third party enforcement, even in Mexico’s 
turbulent revolutionary period, by many mechanisms, including the one referred to in the text. 
6 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) build a theory of democratic transitions around this insight: 
arguing that a transition to democracy is more likely the more unequal is a society and the greater 
the costs of repression   10 
respect to both efficiency and equity.  In particular, in both domains they are 
associated with under-provision of public goods and the perpetuation of economic, 
political and social inequalities. 
 
With respect to inter-elite bargains, the main maladies are the failure to deliver the 
general public goods of credible commitment to investors (including small, informal 
firms), the rule of law and market institutions that support entry and competition. 
This is the flipside of the extraction and appropriation of rents by elite groups—
whether through creation of monopolies, extraction of surpluses from the 
population (e.g. through state agricultural boards) or mining and other natural 
resources.  This is typically associated with a tight nexus between political influence 
and economic resources.  
 
With respect to rent-sharing with middle and poorer groups, the dominant political 
strategy is of clientelism: the provision, via state resources, of private benefits to 
particular groups in return for their political loyalty.   The literature on clientelism 
suggests it comes in two different forms (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Vicente 
and Wantchekon, 2008): targeted benefits to citizens that depend on the holding of 
political power, such as jobs in the public sector (Robinson and Verdier, 2003; 
Keefer and Vlaicu,  2008), or “club” goods to particular localities or groups; and 
petty benefits to less organized supporters, through vote buying, which can also be 
offered by competitors who are not current incumbents. 
 
A more extreme malady comes in the form of use of the state apparatus to predate 
on the population and the country’s resources by the political elite in power.  This is 
typically associated with extensive use of despotic power. 
 
In the African context, both rent-sharing among elite groups, and clientelism are 
often linked to identity-based groups, of ethnicity, religion or region (or all three 
overlapping, as they do in Nigeria and Sudan).  However, this is by no means 
necessarily the case: in Tanzania, ethnicity is not salient in politics, in part due to a 
concerted nation-building strategy.  Yet clientelism is still rampant (Kelsall, 2002).  
Nor are such identity-based links peculiar to Africa: India is a consolidated 
democracy in which identity of caste and religion is highly politically salient: 
Chandra (2004) develops the case that patronage on identity-lines is a rational 
response to the overall clientelistic character of the polity.  
 
While these rent-sharing arrangements are most directly part of the basic political 
structuring of the politics relationship, they also profoundly influence the compact   11 
and client power relationships, and bring associated maladies.  This is for three 
reasons: 
  Bureaucracies and other un-elected positions are in most of Sub-Saharan 
Africa thoroughly embedded in political and social relations (South Africa is 
the most important exception of a country with something close to a 
Weberian bureaucracy).  Indeed, far from “seeing like a state”, in James 
Scott’s characterization of high modernist state functioning, for many 
African states it is more a question of “looking like a state”7.  Elite bargains 
and clientelism are effected through the behavior of bureaucracies, and 
sometimes judiciaries and other state actors, as much as through the 
political process.  
  Where bureaucratic, judicial and other “compact” positions are allocated as a 
form of patronage (to family, friends, co-ethnics, etc), the incentive structure 
is intrinsically about the reciprocal provision of political loyalty, on an 
individual or group basis, as opposed to delivery of a service. This is 
consistent with the malady of low effort, such as teacher absenteeism, that 
was highlighted in the examples in the introduction to this paper. 
  A structurally ineffective state can be part of a self-perpetuating equilibrium.  
Even if shifts in the politics relation lead to a politician wanting to deliver 
public goods, he or she may be unable to do so, given the weakness of the 
state as a lever to do precisely this.  A clientelistic political strategy may be 
forced upon him or her.  
 
These issues apply throughout the state compact system, all the way to the front-
line of service delivery.  It thus also pervades the client power relation, though 
street-level workers are even more likely to be embedded in local political and 
social structures.  Sometimes this can lead to direct social pressures for better 
services, but it can also lead to reinforcing of the generic maladies of the state (see 
discussion of evidence below). 
 
The two rent-sharing relations are also central to the creation and reproduction of 
inequalities.  The extraction and appropriation of rents by elites is a primary source 
of inequality, while clientelistic strategies are a classic political strategy for 
sustaining sufficient support from middle and poorer groups under unequal terms.  
Clientelism also tends to favor those groups with greater capacity to organize (e.g. 
                                                        
7 This phrase is due to anthropologist Steven Pierce in his work on Nigeria [Pierce, 2006]; the theme 
is also emphasized in the neo-patrimonial and other literatures on the African state (e.g. van de 
Walle, 2001)   12 
unions, organized special interest groups) or with ethnic, geographic or other 
identity-based ties to elites in power. 
 
Finally, corruption is intricately linked to these systems.  It is facilitated by the 
combination of creation of rents that are controlled by state (or sometimes non-
state) actors.  It is also linked to both forms of rent-sharing, manifest in high-level 
corruption in major business deals, and the widespread petty corruption faced by 
citizens in their daily lives.  It is also linked to patterns of inequality, since it 
typically benefits political and business elites in the sharing of rents, and, at a lower 
level, officials in public sector jobs. 
 
These deeply embedded political economy and institutional drivers of 
accountability are being subject to incremental changes through at least two 
powerful forces developing in Africa—increasing political competitiveness, and 
greater organization and communication among citizens. We discuss each of these 
trends in turn, to examine how they might be leveraged for greater civil society 
action for accountability. 
 
2.3 Accountability and democratization in Africa 
 
Data from the Polity IV effort, which uses expert opinion of political scientists to 
categorize the extent of autocracy and democracy of a regime, can be used to 
illustrate the nature of the democratic change moving across Africa over the past 20 
years. There is a continuum of regimes, from completely autocratic to a fully 
consolidated democracy, with a large range of intermediate types (that they refer to 
as “anocracies”) that have elements of both autocratic and democratic processes.   
Their synthetic classification uses a numerical system, in which -10 to -7 are 
classified as autocratic, -6 to +6 as intermediate, and +7 to +10 as democratic.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates both the size of the change between 1985 and 2009, and the 
current classification for most of the countries. In the mid-1980s, 31 out of a total of 
40 in the data base were fully autocratic, with only two full-fledged democracies 
(Gambia and Mauritius), and 6 intermediate regimes, most of which had a heavy 
weight of autocracy.  By end-2009, the Polity IV classification has 12 fully 
democratic regimes (Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, 
Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia) and only 3 fully 
autocratic (Eritrea, Somalia and Swaziland8) with a majority being classified as  
                                                        
8 Eritrea and Somalia are not included in the figure, as data was not available for the 
earlier year.   13 
intermediate, or “anocratic”, regimes, most with significant democratic elements 
(including, for example, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe).   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Democratic and autocratic regimes in SubSaharan Africa, 1985 and 2009 
 
Source: Polity IV data base 
 
The democratic wave has been shown to have large consequences for public 
policies.  Harding and Stasavage (2011), for example, show that the transition to 
competitive elections in African countries is associated with the abolition of school 
fees, which in turn is associated with higher rates of school attendance than in non-
democracies.  Kudamatsu (2011) finds in a sample of 28 African countries that 
infant mortality falls by 1.2 percentage points, which is 12 percent of the sample 
mean, after a country has experienced a change in political leadership through the 
winning of multiparty elections. However, this latter example also illustrates the 
limits of elections per se in addressing accountability failures—there is no evidence 
of systematic reduction in infant mortality in countries where an autocrat holds 
multiparty elections and stays in power by winning them.  
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Even competitive elections can be influenced by violence, allegations of fraud, 
contestation of results, and are typically dominated by clientelistic practices of 
winning political support through promises of provision of private or group benefits 
(Keefer and Khemani, 2004). Such clientelist practices can have deep roots in 
historical institutions, as discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, there is 
also substantial variation in performance in growth and human development across 
autocratic regimes, which to a large extent overlaps the variation among democratic 
regimes (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007).  Autocratic and intermediate regimes can 
still be under political pressures to deliver on development to middle and poorer 
groups—as exemplified by countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda that fall into this 
intermediate category.  
 
A growing body of evidence on citizen participation in elections and other political 
processes in Africa is being generated through the use of the Afrobarometer 
surveys.9 Broad arguments are made on the basis of this data that citizen political 
behavior in Africa cannot be reduced only to responding to clientelist appeals and 
ethnic identity, but that performance of governments in managing the economy and 
delivering development matters as well (see for example, Bratton et al, 2011, and 
Young, 2009). Average self-reported voter-turnout in the 2008 round of the 
Afrobarometer survey for both “full democracies” and even intermediate cases, as 
rated by Polity IV, is higher than 70 percent (see Table 1, below). Such widespread 
intentions to participate in political processes likely encompass a variety of citizens, 
some of whom demand broad public services and economic development. In section 
3 below we report evidence from experiments undertaken by civil society 
organizations in Africa to shift citizen demands away from clientelism and towards 
broad public goods. 
 
2.4  Accountability and civil society organization 
 
There also appears to be a large shift in Africa in organization among citizens. 
Village-level group formation in Africa increased dramatically over the 1990s when 
participatory approaches were emphasized in international development 
paradigms, promoted through aid, and adopted deliberately by country 
governments to deliver projects to communities.10 Bernard et al (2008), for 
example, show a rapid proliferation of village organizations (VOs) in a sample of 
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10 Here, we focus on community organizations intended to solve failures in the delivery of local public 
goods; instead of marketed-oriented organizations that have existed primarily in agriculture 
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villages in Senegal and Burkina Faso between 1980 and 2002; in Senegal, by 2002, 
65% of the sample villages had at least one VO (from 10% in 1982); in Burkina Faso, 
91% had one VO by 2002 (from 22% in 1982). By 2002, 69% of households in 
Senegal and 57% in Burkina Faso were participating in some VO.  
 
One of the concerns with donor-driven creation or funding of local groups is that it 
changes the nature of who participates most actively in these groups and to what 
ends.  Arcand and Fafchamps (2008) find that members of externally funded 
organizations are more likely to be older and to have more land wealth. In a 
program in rural Kenya which provided leadership training and agricultural inputs 
to small self-help organizations, with mainly women members, Gugerty and Kremer 
(2006) find that membership in the groups selected for the program changed, with 
greater representation of the more educated, and those more likely to have formal 
sector income. That is, group membership and leadership moved into the hands of 
younger and better educated women, following the injection of external donor 
funding and programs. At the same time, perhaps surprisingly, the program showed 
unimpressive results in terms of productivity gains.  
 
General theoretical treatments of civil society range from a “romantic” view of 
equitable participation in deliberative processes, in which rational argument 
resolves differing views and interest, to one in which civil society is viewed as 
essentially incorporating and perpetuating the unequal patterns of wealth, status, 
power and associated cultural practices within the overall society.11  Indeed, in the 
theory of public choice, the power of organized “special interests”, that pursue their 
partisan objectives, has been blamed for distortions to growth-promoting or 
efficient or equitable fiscal policies even in the context of advanced industrial 
democracies, like the United States, (Tullock, 1959; Becker, 1985). An extreme and 
tragic example of conflict of interests within civil society in Africa is the Hutu 
mobilization (and the use of radio within this) in the Rwandan genocide.  
 
The capacity for voluntary collective action, that is, the organization and exercise of 
action by civil society, is typically unequally distributed in a society. The issue is not 
simply one of whether the more poor and less educated are less likely to participate 
in organized groups (although a review of evidence from various countries by 
Mansuri and Rao, Forthcoming, suggests that can be the case), but a more complex 
one of how broader conditions of inequality influence how groups are organized and 
for what objectives. La Ferrara (2002) provides evidence from Tanzanian villages of 
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is associated in particular with Jurgen Habermas, the view of civil society as reflecting and 
perpetuating inequalities with Pierre Bourdieu.   16 
such complex interaction between village-level inequality and group organization; 
perhaps most interestingly for our current discussion, in more unequal villages, 
individuals are less likely to report trust in the community, and more likely to report 
conflict of interest. There is more rigorous and detailed evidence from India on the 
role of historic institutions of inequality in influencing breakdowns in collective 
action for broad public goods (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Andersen, 2011), 
dissolution of social cooperation (Fehr, Hoff, et al, 2008), and weak performance of 
government poverty alleviation programs (Besley et al, 2004). 
 
Ethnic fragmentation and polarization in many parts of Africa have been blamed for 
the lack of organization by civil society to generate political institutions in the public 
interest (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2010). Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that community 
contributions to public schools and quality of school infrastructure are lower in 
communities with greater ethnic diversity. In experimental work to examine why 
ethnicity matters in lowering contribution to public goods, Habyarimana et al 
(2007) conclude that it is not because of greater altruism towards co-ethnics, or 
greater sharing of common preferences, but rather because of greater power of 
social sanctions within ethnic networks. That is, social networks among co-ethnics 
make reciprocal exchanges easier to achieve.  
 
Perhaps because it facilitates such reciprocal exchange, ethnic identity in Africa may 
be used to sustain clientelist political competition, enabling the type of quid-pro-quo 
interactions of provision of private benefits for political support that allow 
politicians to get away with larger rents and lower public goods. Consistent with 
this view of ethnicity as an instrument of clientelist strategies, Eifert et al (2010) 
find that self-reported ethnic attachment in the Afrobarometer surveys is greater 
when the question is asked nearer to elections.  
 
  Table 1 provides further data on reported participation in groups for 18 
African countries covered by the most recent round of the Afrobarometer survey 
around 2008. On average, across all countries, 26 percent report being active 
members of a group, and 52 percent report frequently attending group meetings. 
Reported participation does not appear to be strikingly different across the 
countries classified as “full democracies” by Polity IV, versus those classified as 
“anocratic”. Indeed, there is significant variation in group participation within these 
categories across countries. Among the full democracies, the highest ranking (South 
Africa and Botswana) have active group membership reported by only 16 and 17 
percent, compared to a Kenya and a Liberia lower down the “democracy” scale, with   17 
43 and 45 percent respectively. Among the “anocracies”, group membership and 
attendance in meetings is particularly high for Tanzania.12  
 
The Afrobarometer data suggest that local-level organization of civil society into 
groups does not exclude the poor. For six countries—Benin, Botswana, Ghana, 
Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—an indicator of poverty in the Afrobarometer 
(when a respondent mentions that the household has gone without adequate food 
many times in the recent past) is significantly associated with greater attendance of 
group meetings (after controlling for respondent age, gender, education, media 
access, household size, and neighborhood availability of infrastructure). However, 
the extent to which these groups indeed represent the interests of the poor, or have 
impact on improved accountability for development outcomes are questions on 
which the evidence is patchy. This will be discussed in the following section. 
However, what can also be seen in the Afrobarometer data for seven countries-- 
Benin, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe—is that 
respondents that report going without food many times (an indicator of poverty) 
are significantly more likely to report fear of punishment or reprisals should they 
complain about poor quality of government services or misuse of government funds.  
 
In five countries—Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—respondents that 
report frequent attendance in group meetings are also more likely to be those with 
ethnic grievances. In these countries, ethnic grievance is also correlated with 
respondents reporting any instances of joining with others to raise an issue. 
Whether their participation in group and organized activities is geared towards 
broad collective action or narrower redress of ethnic grievances is an important 
concern for the efficacy of civil society action in addressing broad accountability 
failures.  
 
  These insights from research and evidence into local-level groups, and how 
their membership and leadership changes in response to the availability of external 
funding is pertinent for other donor initiatives to promote transparency and 
accountability through national groups and associations. We are not able to uncover 
any systematic evidence on the organization and incentives of such national civil 
society organizations. However, some types of activities undertaken by these groups 
have been subjected to rigorous impact evaluation in collaboration with 
independent researchers. The next section will discuss the state of evidence on 
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(Khemani) with posters listing village groups and their membership being plastered all over the 
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particular types of interventions that could be undertaken by national groups to 
influence civil society organization to extract greater accountability.  
 
Another interesting type of organization which could play a role, but again one on 
which we are not able to find systematic evidence in Africa, are business 
associations.  As already emphasized, firms need a variety of public goods—most 
fundamentally the public good of credible commitments not to expropriate profits 
or assets once investments have been made—but also the provision of law and 
order, the underpinnings of contracts, a framework for labor relations and “real” 
public goods such as roads, ports, electricity networks and an education and 
training system that generates adequate skills.  But both the general public good of 
credible policy commitment and specific public goods are hard to deliver (Haber et 
al, 2003). 
 
Where these dilemmas are not resolved, the result is low levels of private 
investment and so low growth. This can also make a predatory policy, as opposed to 
a pro-development one, a more attractive political strategy.  As discussed above, 
rent-sharing arrangements between political and business elites, with credible 
punishment for political elites in the event of reneging, are a solution to the 
commitment problem, but an imperfect one.  And specific deals, for construction 
contracts, forestry concessions, mining production, the array of specific licenses 
needed for production and so on, are often obtained through personalized, corrupt 
transactions.  Longer-term relations are based on the various forms of legal and 
illegal political finance. 
 
This is where there is a potential role for business associations.  On the one hand 
their function is to represent the interests of capital—and for society as a whole, 
there is a need for countervailing structures, such as trade unions, civil society 
groups or political representatives—to ensure that overall accountability is not 
skewed toward these interests.  But they can also play a role in solving collective 
action problems within the business sector, both among large and small firms, and 
in pressing for states to deliver the general public goods for capitalist production as 
opposed to particularistic (and often corrupt) deals. 
 
3. Evidence on the impact of specific interventions 
Specific types of interventions have been pursued by civil society organizations, and 
supported by donors, to achieve incremental change within the broader systemic 
failures in accountability, both through addressing citizen participation in political 
processes and through citizen participation in monitoring and managing state-
funded programs. This section focuses on assessing what the evidence tells us from   19 
interventions that have been rigorously evaluated, and identifying where there are 
large knowledge gaps compared to the theoretical potential examined in the 
analytical section. It makes selective use of some studies as examples, while 
referring to other comprehensive reviews that are available for broader 
conclusions. A literature review was also undertaken specifically for this paper, 
focusing on evidence generated through randomized control trials and other 
econometric methods for rigorous identification of impact, and classifying the 
interventions according to the arm of the accountability triangle at which they were 
aimed.13 This is appended to the paper. 
Most of the interventions that have been carefully evaluated use some form of 
“information and transparency”, not only to address information gaps among 
citizens, but rather to use more strategic packaging of evidence and advocacy to 
mobilize and persuade citizens to address accountability failures. That is, the 
interventions typically rely on a combination of all three types of mechanisms—
addressing information gaps, mobilizing or coordinating citizens for collective 
action, and redressing weak sanctioning power.  
  Solving accountability failures in politics:  
  “Open budget” initiatives. Making greater information available about 
government budgets has been at the center of many donor-supported civil society 
initiatives. Citizen action, and donor pressure on governments has contributed to 
the adoption of legislation for citizens’ “Right to Information”, and to various 
initiatives to facilitate citizen ability to monitor public budgets and allocation of 
public resources, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the 
Open Budget Index. Descriptions of these initiatives, and reviews of evidence of 
their impact are provided by McGee and Gaventa (2010) and Gaventa and Barrett 
(2010). We classify these initiatives as addressing the “politics” arm of 
accountability between citizens and political leadership of states, geared as they are 
towards improving general accountability of overall state resource allocation. 
Much of the evidence on how these initiatives work and what impact they 
have appears to be qualitative, and focuses on intermediate outcomes such as 
whether citizens indeed became more informed and engaged in budget processes. 
There are also some quantitative studies reviewed specifically in a background 
paper prepared by Carlitz (2010) for the synthesis report prepared by McGee and 
Gaventa (2010), that provide mostly cross-country correlations of indicators of 
greater budget transparency with indicators of governance, corruption, socio-
economic and human development, and even political participation. As with all such 
types of cross-country correlations, however, there is an important concern about 
causality—it is not possible to draw strong conclusions about whether specific 
budget transparency initiatives in fact lead to the better outcomes, or whether other 
underlying changes in government accountability to citizens drive the outcomes 
together. Micro-quantitative evidence of impact on budget allocations (which areas 
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get more or less allocations), and budget implementation (whether the allocations 
translated into better services or outcomes) appears to be almost entirely missing.  
There is evidence on a specific type of budget information which was 
pioneered in the education sector in Uganda. Purposefully designed survey 
instruments—named the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)—were used 
to measure discrepancies between budget allocations to schools in Uganda, and 
what actually reached the schools (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). One study argues 
that the publication in mass media of estimated “leakage” in the flow of funds led to 
dramatic improvements, with most of the intended funds reaching the schools 
subsequent to the information campaign (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). In this 
argument, accountability for the flow of funds improved because of addressing 
information gaps among parents in schools, and thus enabling them to exercise their 
client power vis a vis district authorities responsible for transferring funds to 
schools.  
Following the celebrated success of the Uganda case there has been a 
proliferation of PETS activities, and external investments in strengthening the 
capacity of civil society organizations to undertake such surveys to uncover and 
publicize “leakage” and thereby stem it. More qualitative evaluations of these efforts 
suggest that they can be frequently successful in getting the funds to reach the 
intended destinations, although to a lesser degree than the estimates in Uganda 
(McGee and Gaventa, 2010).  
However, alternate arguments about the drivers of success in the Uganda 
case indicate that the client-power channel was only part of the story. Hubbard 
(2007) examines larger changes in school funding policies in the Ugandan Ministry 
of Education, and suggests that the information that activated client-power may 
have been only one element in increasing the amount of resources available in 
schools; that other, perhaps larger, elements consisted of strengthening of the 
compact between the Ministry and the districts following President Museveni’s 
1996 election campaign in which free and universal primary education was a 
prominent agenda. This argument thus suggests that pressures working through the 
politics relationship led to a greater focus on education funding and to a better 
compact for education services. The role played by client power was a complement 
to changing political incentives within the state.  
Are there other interventions that could enable civil society to influence the 
politics relationship to demand stronger changes in the compact? For example, the 
school grants covered by the PETS in Uganda are estimated to be a much smaller 
proportion of total government spending on education compared to teacher salaries 
(Hubbard, 2007). Other work on public education spending, and on the political 
economy of teacher management as a manifestation of clientelism, suggests that the 
compact with teachers is especially weak because citizens’ demand from politicians 
for quality education services is not sufficiently strong.  This takes us to evidence on 
information and communication campaigns to mobilize voters around broad public 
interest policies.   21 
Voter education: Can civil society engagement undercut clientelist politics, 
and better coordinate citizen demand for quality public services? A series of voter 
education experiments have been undertaken between CSOs and researchers in 
Benin, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique, and Nigeria to reduce clientelism and 
violence in elections (Vicente and Wantchekon, 2008; Aker et al, 2010; Collier and 
Vicente, 2010). 
In Benin, a civil society group organized town-hall meetings with real 
political candidates in the first round of the 2006 Presidential elections, to discuss 
specific policy proposals informed by empirical evidence (Wantchekon, 2009). The 
results of the impact evaluation suggest that where such town-halls were held, voter 
turnout was higher and support for clientelist political platforms was lower.  
In São Tomé and Príncipe and Mozambique voter education campaigns were 
undertaken to persuade voters not to “sell” their vote. Previous work in São Tomé 
and Príncipe had documented that vote-buying practices increased dramatically in 
the late 1990s, after the discovery of oil (Vicente, 2010). Such practices have been 
analyzed as enabling political leaders to get away with large rents from public 
resources, while providing low quality and quantity of public services. In Nigeria, 
community campaigns were undertaken by civil society groups to encourage voters 
to oppose political intimidation or violence (Collier and Vicente, 2010). This body of 
work focuses on measuring impact on explicit political outcomes, such as voter 
turnout and use of different electoral strategies by incumbents and challengers. 
There is also evidence from other regions, relevant for Africa, on voter 
education campaigns to reduce the extent to which citizens vote on the basis of 
ethnic identity (India) or gifts (vote-buying in the Philippines). Banerjee et al (2010) 
evaluate the impact of interventions by a CSO in India to persuade voters not to vote 
on the basis of caste identity of candidates; the results show that these were 
effective in increasing voter turnout and reducing the votes of caste-preferred 
candidates with criminal records. Schaffer (2005) provides qualitative evidence 
from the Philippines that voter education campaigns to reduce vote-buying 
practices may have unintended effects; that such campaigns may offend target 
groups and intensify “class divides” between the middle or upper classes that are 
the sponsors of the campaigns, and the poor, who are convinced of the legitimacy of 
receiving benefits from politicians in exchange for their vote.  
While these are important examples of the engagement of civil society in 
strengthening political accountability by making elections more effective 
mechanisms for evaluating the policy performance of candidates, this body of work 
is not designed to examine the ultimate impact on policies and development 
outcomes. It is therefore not immediately clear whether even significant electoral 
effects of voter education campaigns would effectively translate into different or 
better policy choices. For example, if the campaigns primarily strengthen the hands 
of incumbent politicians (by reducing the efficacy of vote-buying tactics employed 
by political challengers), they may be further protected from the risks of losing 
office and able to continue rent-extraction policies.    22 
The example from the Philippines also suggests that tackling the proximate 
symptoms of clientelist political competition directly may not be effective. An 
alternate strategy, akin to the Benin town halls, could use information on policy 
performance to coordinate voters better on public goods platforms. Can policy-
based information and mobilization interventions overcome collective action 
problems (such as social polarization, ethnic fragmentation, and vote-selling), and 
weak sanctioning power (such as through state-led coercion and violence in 
elections)? 
Politician and Constituency Report Cards: Civil society organizations in 
some countries have attempted to garner and provide information on performance 
of politicians in delivering benefits to their constituents. Banerjee et al (2010) 
evaluate the impact in India of providing information on the performance of state 
legislators in delivering constituency development projects and subsidized food 
rations to the poor. They find that greater information enabled voters to punish 
incumbents who performed poorly by voting against them in local elections. 
However, a similar experiment in Uganda with the African Leadership Initiative, 
providing information about the legislative activities of their MPs, and efforts 
towards spending their constituency development funds, seems to have had little or 
no impact on election outcomes (Humphreys and Weinstein, Forthcoming). Full 
results from Uganda are not currently available to assess whether greater 
performance information may nevertheless have contributed to improvements in 
legislator use of their funds, with the politicians changing their behavior in 
anticipation of electoral punishment. Keefer and Khemani (2009) find more 
qualitative evidence from India that a surge in media reporting about the lack of 
effort among MPs in using their constituency development funds was associated 
with dramatic increases in legislator effort and utilization of funds.  
There is a new civil society effort underway in Africa, called Uwezo14, to 
measure education service delivery and learning outcomes on a large scale, enabling 
performance measures to be computed at disaggregated jurisdictional levels such as 
districts. Such disaggregated measurement could potentially enable attribution of 
performance in delivering education services to specific government agents and 
politicians. The Uwezo effort was partly inspired by a similar effort in India, called 
ASER (Annual Status of Education Report), run by the organization Pratham15. 
Although media stories would suggest that such initiatives contribute to 
strengthening political accountability for education outcomes, because of the 
information generated and collective pressure exerted by CSOs, there is as yet no 
rigorous evidence of how this changes key politically motivated distortions in 
education allocations.  In the case of India,  five years of ASER reports has played an 
important role in raising public awareness of the education quality, but has 
essentially found no overall increase in test scores for rural children in the period to 
2010 (ASER 2011).  There remains substantial untapped potential for examining 
whether such disaggregated information can indeed generate sufficient political 
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pressure and yardstick competition across jurisdictions to improve performance 
(Khemani, 2007).   
Brazil provides a qualitative example of successful experience with this type 
of information intervention, albeit one that was led by a “reformist” leader rather 
than by civil society organizations (Tendler, 1997). The Governor of the state of 
Ceará in Brazil, who took office in 1987, supported a strategy of creating a new class 
of public health workers through a publicized recruitment effort that conveyed 
information to communities about the valuable role the workers could play in 
improving public health through community-wide effort. The strategy also included 
extensive use of radio with messages about how infant and child mortality could be 
drastically reduced through particular programs of municipal governments, thus 
bringing political pressure to bear upon the mayors to actually deliver basic health 
services.  In only a few years coverage of measles and polio vaccination in Ceará 
tripled to 90 percent of the child population, and infant deaths fell from 102 to 65 
per thousand births. In addition to the specific health example, the state government 
leadership has been generally credited with using various means to bringing a 
remarkable turnaround in the municipal politics of the state—from clientelist and 
patronage-based to more service-oriented. 
More recently, Brazil has been the source of another example of higher-tier 
government efforts to reduce local political rent-seeking by generating and 
providing credible information to citizens. In May 2003 the national government of 
Brazil launched an anti-corruption program based on the random auditing of 
municipal government expenditures by an independent public agency, and then 
publicly releasing audit findings on the internet and to media sources.16 New 
evidence from more than 600 municipalities covered by the audit suggests that the 
disclosure of information significantly and substantially reduced the re-election 
rates of mayors who were found to be corrupt (Ferraz and Finan, 2006). 
Furthermore, this impact was significantly more pronounced in municipalities with 
greater access to radio stations.  
What these examples suggest is the potential of particular types of 
information interventions that not only address information gaps, but also enable 
voter collective action and sanctions through greater coordination around the 
information. However, it is not clear that civil society organizations would be able to 
replicate the Brazilian success in the absence of leadership in some part within 
Government or through institutionalized state agencies.  
An important question suggested by this for external donor assistance to civil 
society in Africa is whether performance information can be credibly generated and 
communicated in the way it was by the government of Brazil, and in ways that 
sustains the effects in between elections. Again, how would such information 
overcome the collective action problems posed by social polarization, ethnic 
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fragmentation and vote-selling? Or of problems of weak sanctioning power of voters 
because of state-led violence and coercion in elections? 
Mass media: The potential role of media organizations, such as radio, seems 
obvious as purveyors of information to large numbers of citizens, especially the 
poor. Indeed, donors have been engaged in setting-up and supporting community 
radio in various parts of Africa to broadcast public-interest programming for 
democratic values, human rights, and the importance of health and education. Yet, 
there is little rigorous evidence of their impact; recent work using new and unique 
data from Benin yields surprising conclusions for the advocates of community radio. 
Keefer and Khemani (2011a, 2011b) find that greater access to community radio in 
Benin is not associated with the ability of citizens to extract greater benefits from 
their government; instead, the impact of radio programming seems to be to 
persuade people to invest more of their own private resources into the education of 
their children and the health of their family. While this is a useful role for mass 
media to play in development, it is unrelated to the accountability challenge. 
This contrasts with evidence from the post-Depression-era USA, when radio 
had just begun to spread, that greater access to radio enabled citizens to receive 
greater benefits from government welfare spending (Stromberg, 2004). It also 
contrasts with the experience from Uganda and elsewhere when media were used 
purposefully to disseminate information about leakage in public resources; in such 
cases they were instrumental in stimulating public opinion and action to reduce 
such leakage (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005, as discussed above). This suggests that 
investments in building capacity of media alone, and advocating their independence 
from the state, may not be sufficient to achieve greater accountability—investing 
further in well-designed messages, either those that can enable voters to coordinate 
on policy performance, or those that are endorsed by the state in an effort to 
improve efficiency in its public spending (as in the Brazil examples discussed above) 
is needed. 
Although theory suggests an accountability role for mass media, it also 
suggests that media could be used for political “posturing” and “pandering”, 
reducing incentives to pursue actions that contribute to broad public goods. (Prat, 
2005; Besley and Prat, 2006; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2002; Maskin and Tirole, 
2004). For example, when there is uncertainty about the effects of different policies, 
and policymakers/politicians as “experts” have access to greater private 
information about these different effects than do voters, media coverage may induce 
politicians to take positions that cater to voter beliefs, ignoring their private 
information that could lead to better policy decisions.  
The policy mantra for media development for accountability seems to be to 
pursue laws and regulations for media independence from state control, which 
while probably necessary doesn't address other incentive issues in competitive 
media markets. First, even independent media may be manipulated by governments 
seeking to broadcast propaganda messages, or because politicians service the 
partisan interests of media owners—that is, independent media can be "lapdogs" 
rather than "watchdogs"(Qian and Yanagizawa, 2010). Second, media have   25 
incentives to “slant” the news to cater to people's priors, instead of reporting 
unbiased information. Recent empirical estimates of the large effects of radio on 
violence in Rwanda, concluding that “hate radio” may explain as much as 9 percent 
of the genocide (Yanagizawa, 2010), is a singularly dramatic demonstration of a 
general proposition that media effects are contingent upon the messages and 
programming broadcast, which depend on larger political incentives and biases and 
prejudices among citizens.  
The conventional wisdom on the drivers of the recent Arab Spring indicates 
that citizen collective action on such a large scale was facilitated by social media and 
information and communication technology (ICT). Indeed, pioneering efforts such 
as Ushahidi17, to develop platforms for “crowd-sourced” information have their 
roots in Africa, with much enthusiasm that such technological advances can have far 
reaching accountability effects by spurring collective action among citizens. Again, 
however, there is little rigorous research on whether or how ICTs enable greater 
public accountability. Most of the work on ICT, accountability and transparency, 
remains at the level of assuming that greater use of and investment in such 
technology are both necessary and sufficient, with little or no work investigating 
what kinds of accountability messages or interventions, delivered through ICT, do or 
don’t achieve impact on development effectiveness. There is substantial scope for 
pursuing such a research program, which may have especially large returns in terms 
of reaching the pivotal “youth” group for democratic political stability that is 
conducive to good economic policies. 
The question for external support to citizen media and ICT organizations, 
once again, is whether such support can promote information for development and 
public interest accountability. There is little knowledge of what does or does not 
work in using media and ICT to promote accountability for development 
effectiveness. Addressing this knowledge gap requires a program of rigorous, data-
based impact evaluation, rather than simply greater advocacy for greater media 
independence and transparency. What accountability or governance interventions 
facilitated by media can improve the quality of public services? Do media help to 
make public-payroll teachers show-up and teach in schools? Do they improve the 
implementation of public health programs? Can media do this only through the 
strengthening of compact and client power by “willing” state agencies; or, can it 
address the more fundamental political constraints to weak compacts and client 
power in the first place? What types of intervention design can overcome potentially 
harmful civil society action along ethnic lines?  
  Solving accountability failures in compact and client power:  
A wide range of interventions have been pursued by governments and 
donors in engaging civil society in local communities to monitor and directly 
participate in the delivery of public services. Some of the initiatives of civil society 
organizations, such as Uwezo and ASER, discussed above as information 
interventions that potentially influence politically accountability, may indeed not be 
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primarily described by their organizations as such, but rather more about 
community mobilization and engagement to take direct action to improve public 
services.  
Citizen Report Cards: The experience of a CSO based in Bangalore, India, the 
Public Affairs Centre, in pioneering the use of “citizen report cards” as a tool for 
client power has been celebrated in much of the development policy literature. In 
the anecdotal evidence provided by Paul (2002), this initiative aggregated citizen 
perceptions of the quality of urban services provided by various agencies in the city 
of Bangalore, then publicized these through local media, serving as a massive, 
collective complaint mechanism. This either “shamed” the agencies into improving 
services, or sent a strong signal to local municipal politicians that citizens care about 
service delivery and the politicians in turn put pressure on the providers to improve 
performance.  Subsequent surveys by the same CSO report substantial 
improvements in perceptions of service over time. 
However, there are diverging results from more rigorous evaluation of such 
initiatives in rural areas of India and Africa (Uganda). In Uganda, Bjorkman and 
Svensson (2006) report on interventions in 25 communities where local CSOs 
organized meetings between community members and health service providers of 
public clinics around citizen report cards on the quality of care provided at these 
clinics. Compared to “control” communities where no such discussion took place, in 
intervention communities both provider attendance and quality of service measures 
(including wait time and quality of care) improved. The final result was an increase 
in the immunization rate and a substantial drop in child mortality in the 
communities where the mobilization interventions occurred. The evidence suggests 
that these improvements in health services resulted from greater activism by the 
community in monitoring health clinics and demanding improvements, most likely 
through existing beneficiary-control institutions called Health Users Management 
Committees (HUMCs).  This is a case in which information, and possibly 
complementary mobilization, activated a client power mechanism that the state has 
already set up. 
However, similar meetings that were organized by a CSO (Pratham, 
mentioned earlier) in India around citizen report cards on the quality of education 
services in 195 intervention villages had no impact on teacher effort, or on learning 
outcomes in public schools (Banerjee et al, 2010). The intervention also had no 
impact on a beneficiary-control institution existing in the state (Uttar Pradesh) 
where the study was conducted—the Village Education Committee (VEC), which is 
authorized by the state and in principle operates much like the HUMCs for health 
services in Uganda. In both UP and Uganda these existing institutions were found to 
be inactive at the baseline.  
Yet, perhaps the most striking finding of the India study is that in one set of 
intervention villages, where the citizen report card was combined with an offer by 
Pratham to train village volunteers to hold remedial classes outside school, a large 
number of local youths volunteered to hold such classes, completely bypassing the 
public school system. In these villages, the children who attended the volunteer-led   27 
remedial classes made dramatic improvements in learning. Better information here 
induced greater private efforts, by the volunteers and the families of the children.  
Such instances of direct citizen participation are of course inspiring, but leave open 
a billion-dollar question (in the context of public spending on education in India)—
how to make the substantial allocation of public resources to education less 
wasteful and more effective in delivering development ? These villages in north 
India were able to take private collective action to help themselves, facilitated by the 
CSO Pratham, but were not able to overcome the barriers to holding local politicians 
and bureaucrats to account for the large amounts of state resources going to salaries 
of absent teachers and captured school construction. 
Furthermore, the results of the participatory interventions documented in 
Banerjee et al (2010) contrasts with those of another information intervention in 
similar villages in the same part of north India which was not as participatory but 
rather carried the seal of the state department of education, and was delivered 
through a savvy video played to village gatherings (Pandey et al, 2009). This 
resulted in the village public school teacher reducing absenteeism, with some 
discernable effects on improvements in learning among children. 
 
Such large variation both within and across different information 
interventions to mobilize citizens to increase their client power suggests that local 
context and the larger political economy environment matter significantly for 
success, especially in supporting (or not) citizen engagement in strengthening 
compacts or authorized client-power structures with public providers.  
 
A rigorous impact evaluation of another type of client-power initiative to 
combat corruption in local infrastructure construction projects was able to directly 
contrast the efficiency of citizen-led initiatives with other technocratic means of 
strengthening the compact between the state and local providers. In Indonesia, 
Olken (2005) compared the impact of information provision to local citizens about 
corruption in local roads projects against that of a technocratic government-led 
initiative—credible audits of local projects by higher tier authorities. He finds that 
the state-led audits were substantially more effective at reducing corruption than 
the intervention based on information and local collective action. Another study, in 
Madagascar, contrasting interventions designed to encourage district education 
bureaucrats to improve their monitoring of schools, versus directly engaging school 
communities to do so, instead finds that local-level monitoring was more effective 
(Nguyen and Lassibille, 2008). However, in contrast to the certain-audit 
intervention in Indonesia, the Madagascar intervention did not require district 
officials to improve their monitoring.  
 
Community “management” committees: There are a large number of initiatives 
pursued by governments and donors to organize citizens in local communities into 
committees to manage environmental resources, targeting of benefits of poverty 
alleviation schemes, infrastructure projects, health and education services (as in the 
cases of HUMCs in Uganda and VECs in India described above). In an extensive   28 
review of the evidence of the impact of such initiatives, Mansuri and Rao 
(Forthcoming), conclude that there is variation in the success of such initiatives 
which depends on the nature of social organization across communities (the degree 
of inequality, in particular), the technical complexity of projects, and importantly, on 
whether higher-tier state agencies indeed provide the powers and resources to local 
committees to be effective. That is, these initiatives can serve to strengthen client-
power and/or compact, as long as they are appropriately designed and supported to 
do so by higher state agencies, and as long as collective action processes within 
communities can work.  
Participatory budgeting: Participatory budgeting, another initiative popular 
with donors and some governments to engage civil society to address accountability 
problems, where citizens directly participate in formulating budgets of local 
governments, was pioneered in the city of Porto Allegre in Brazil, where the city 
council devolved decision making over new capital investments to citizen councils. 
This devolution has been credited in qualitative analysis with substantial 
improvements in local governance and responsiveness to the needs of the poor, 
although there is a problem in attributing gains to the institution of participatory 
budgeting. The introduction of participatory budgeting in Porto Allegre went hand-
in-hand with the election of a particular political party (the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, or Workers Party) which catered to a particular constituency of 
citizen activists (and therefore adopted a specific mode of participatory institutions 
to implement its compact) and had broader incentives to service the poor.  
Baiocchi et al (2011) use a regression discontinuity empirical design to 
address the possible conflation of the political effects of voter support for the 
Partido dos Trabalhadores with the use of the institution of participatory 
budgeting—they compare outcomes across municipalities where the party won or 
lost the elections by a narrow margin. These municipalities are therefore similar in 
voter support for the party, but in only one set, where the party won narrowly, was 
participatory budgeting adopted by the municipality. They report differences in the 
process of citizen engagement with the local government, but do not examine 
impact on outcomes of service delivery or poverty reduction. Further, they conclude 
that even the impact on greater inclusion of citizens in government decision-making 
is conditional on pre-existing state-citizen relationships, that is, on the political 
relationship. 
Community-driven-development (CDD) projects. Several community-
driven-development (CDD) projects "bundle" different interventions that potentially 
impact each arm of accountability: they change the compact by transferring 
funds/project management from line ministries to local governments or to newly 
created local agencies with direct citizen representation (such as school 
committees); they change client power by allowing such agencies of citizen 
representation some power over service providers; they change politics by 
increasing the representation of some groups (women, youth, traditionally 
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broader political incentives; they also change politics by attempting to increase 
social cohesion for greater collective action. 
Again, drawing upon the extensive review of such projects in Mansuri and 
Rao (Forthcoming), the broad conclusion is that while citizen participation in 
project design and implementation can have beneficial effects on project outcomes 
(better design, better quality, better targeting of benefits to the poorest), this varies 
across communities with variation in characteristics of initial inequality, social 
cohesion, and state-citizen relations (politics). Furthermore, in the available 
evidence, there has been little scope to test whether there is any impact on political 
inclusion of marginalized groups and social cohesion, leading to effects on the 
politics relationship that could extend beyond the project.  
Two more recent pieces of work that have attempted to examine impact on 
political accountability, through broader political inclusion and social cohesion, 
reach different conclusions. Casey et al (2011) conclude from the detailed 
examination of a CDD program in Sierra Leone that although it improved local 
public goods provision and household welfare in the short-run (which could be 
because of the increased funds provided), there was no long-term or durable impact 
on local institutions of decision-making, inclusion, and collective action. In contrast, 
Fearon et al (2009) find in Liberia that a CDD project did not have significant impact 
on local household welfare measures, but that in project villages the results of 
behavioral games played with community members indicates greater social 
cohesion and willingness to contribute to public goods.  
Community-driven reconstruction in post-conflict settings. The two 
studies just referenced are examples of particular types of CDD projects with the 
broader aim of providing benefits to the poor and building social cohesion in post-
conflict environments. Once again, a broader review of the evidence of such forms of 
engaging civil society, both to deliver project benefits and to address the root 
causes, perhaps, of conflict, concludes with strikingly mixed messages (Mansuri and 
Rao, Forthcoming). While there are some qualitative cases of success in both 
delivering benefits to the poor and to ex-combatants, and in engaging civil society to 
confront violent actors, others find that the poor and marginalized find it even 
harder to access project benefits in conflict areas, and that governments only 
selectively scale-up such projects in areas where they command political support. 
The authors of the positive outcomes measured in Liberia, Fearon et al (2011), point 
out that their results may not speak to addressing conflict per se, because conflict 
usually occurs at higher levels than that of the local “community” targeted by 
CDD/CDR projects. It is even possible that strengthening cohesion within 
communities may worsen conflict across communities.  
In sum. Interventions that organize civil society to improve the compact and 
client-power can be effective; however, much depends on project design and initial 
conditions of inequality and social cohesion that vary across communities.  This 
does not imply that community participation in projects involving public goods will 
always fail in communities with high levels of inequality or weak social cohesion 
(low “social capital).  Khwaja (Forthcoming) finds that modifying project design can   30 
compensate for such features of local communities in his analysis of community-
maintained infrastructure in Northern Pakistan.  In particular, reducing project 
complexity and confining community participation to non-technical aspects of 
maintenance improved outcomes in “social adverse” settings; moreover, projects 
initiated by communities and NGOs had much greater success than those started by 
governments. That is, much depends on whether political relations are sufficiently 
strong to give incentives to governments to select good project design, tailored to 
community conditions.  
More broadly, however, it is almost never possible to make a general 
statement that civil society engagement is more effective than technocratic changes 
to the compact between governments and their local agents, bureaucrats and public 
providers. Even when governments allow (driven by donor or NGO pressure) or 
elect to undertake projects that engage civil society, they may continue to let their 
bureaucrats and providers get away with high salaries and low effort in servicing 
citizens, especially the poor. There has been little scope to test whether 
participatory interventions at the local level have impact on civil society capacity for 
demanding accountability outside the narrow scope of specific projects; in the few 
cases where such testing is possible, there is no evidence of impact outside the 
project. This pattern of evidence lends itself to a general concern with community 
participation, that is also expressed in Banerjee and Duflo (2008), that the 
responsibility for managing successful projects is being palmed-off to largely poor 
communities, and could be viewed as a tax on their time and efforts; as opposed to 
other modalities of improving accountability of government agents to work harder 
and better for the poor. 
Evidence is particularly lagging on the potentially central domain of how civil 
society could solve accountability problems in politics and thereby strengthen 
incentives of higher-tier governments to pursue appropriate interventions for 
improved compact and client power. For example, there is little rigorous impact 
evaluation of the role of mass media and cutting-edge communication technologies, 
that are proliferating across Africa, and being credited in the conventional wisdom 
with strengthening political accountability; on the contrary, available evidence 
provides sobering conclusions that media can be either ineffective or even tragically 
misused. Such large evidence gaps have implications for external aid strategies in 
supporting civil society in Africa to address accountability failures.  
 
4.  Accountability, civil society and external donors 
 
Should external donors support civil society to tackle accountability problems in 
African states?  Is this a route to improving delivery of public goods, whether for 
poverty reduction, human development or dynamic business investment?  The 
analysis of this paper indicates that such action, while surely desirable, is fraught 
with both difficulties and uncertainties—difficulties because of the intrinsic 
problem of an external actor seeking to change a socio-political system, and 
uncertainties because of the weak information on what does and does not work.    31 
There is a case for external action, but the intervention needs to be designed in ways 
that takes account of these constraints, with a particular emphasis on a process of 
discovery and experimentation of what works. 
 
In the core aid community there has been extensive interest in areas related to 
accountability since the mid-1990s, with activities supporting “governance” and 
community-driven development (CDD), as well as a longer tradition of support for 
various aspects of institutional development.  The history is cautionary with respect 
to actual results.  For example, reviews of the impact of World Bank support for 
public sector reform suggest mixed results at best.  While there have been some 
highly celebrated CDD programs (e.g. the Self-help group movement in India), actual 
evidence of major change is also weak, as indicated in the review of evidence above 
and other more extensive reviews (Mansuri and Rao, Forthcoming).  In this paper 
we suggest that ignoring the underlying political economy drivers of accountability 
may have been a principal factor accounting for cases where results were less than 
satisfactory. 
 
First, aid for improved accountability improvements will get lost within a 
generalized clientelistic or predatory state system, whether the aid is attempting to 
improve public administration against the grain of the underlying incentives and 
organizational culture, or supporting small local islands of client power. 
 
Second, aid can often be a source of distortions within the system, especially when it 
is large in scale (as it is in many African countries).  Of course, aid is generally trying 
to change parts of the system, but it all too often has an inadequate theory of change, 
and becomes a source of unintended, adverse consequences.  Support for “civil 
society” is just as likely to be distortive as accountability-improving, if it is ill-
designed. 
 
Third, aid for civil society can become a basis for new breeds of rent-seeking NGOs 
complete with mutually agreeable new narratives, just as African counterparts in 
the 1980s and 1990s learnt the language of structural adjustment, even while the 
aid was going into a still highly clientelistic system. 
 
Our review of the evidence—that includes a significant proportion of aid-supported 
initiatives—shows that our current state of knowledge of just how externally 
supported action interacts with civil society initiatives is very weak, both because 
many results are limited and ambiguous, and also because most results are for local 
islands of action, with unusually large uncertainties over scalability. 
 
Some practical implications 
 
The analysis of this paper presents a difficult challenge: it develops the case for 
systemic change, while showing the difficulty of external aid initiatives’ doing this 
successfully (and not making things worse) and the lack of clear evidence on what 
does work.  To resolve this challenge, we suggest some principles that external   32 
donors can apply in ensuring that their interventions in supporting civil society to 
strengthen accountability will lead to an improvement.  
  
In general, aid is most likely to be effective if it essentially organic, in the sense of (a) 
supporting existing domestic initiatives and pressures for change, and (b) in ways 
that are consistent with the initial state of the polity.  The latter is likely to vary 
significantly across countries.  This suggests a procedural case for linking external 
support with diagnosis of the institutional functioning of a country, sector, region or 
wherever the focus of desired action is.  
 
In addition there are a number of areas where there is a good prima facie case for 
support, provided the general conditions apply.  This will typically be a function of 
the nature of overall polity. For example, there is the largest range of potential 
action for democracies with real political competition, albeit of a competitive 
clientelistic form, whether the regime is consolidated or fragile.  Here are some 
categories. 
 
  There is a strong case for general support on information-related 
initiatives—from information on politician performance, to school test 
results, procurement processes and so on. 
 
  There is also a contingent case for support for local organizational initiatives 
that are working with and processing information that the evidence base 
suggests has potential in solving accountability problems. This is related to 
the broad point that citizens and state actors do not need full information, 
but information salient to specific aspects of performance assessment.  This 
domain can include NGOs working with right-to-information laws, think 
tanks analyzing budgets or regulator behavior, or service delivery outcomes, 
etc. 
 
  A related area concerns support for information for benchmarking of 
performance of local levels of government, e.g. municipalities; or across local 
service providers (schools; electricity and water supply), where service 
quality can be measured and compared 
 
  It often makes sense to support local client-power-related initiatives, but 
these are only likely to be fruitful if linked to broader change over the long 
route. 
 
  Support for the strengthening of compact mechanisms is highly desirable if 
this has domestic political and technical support.  
 
  There are two kinds of roles for civil society in the business sector.   33 
o  Support for processes that provide mechanisms for both identifying 
and resolving conflicts between business investment and social and 
environmental concerns, especially in mining and urban development. 
o  Support for business associations working for public goods for 
business, e.g. agencies such as IFC that are concerned with private 
business, with the important concern that this needs to take account 
of conflicts of interest  in aid, since such agencies are also often 
engaged with particular investment projects and firms. 
 
Finally, in all cases, there is a need to base any support in an analysis of the nature 
and functioning of civil society.  As has been emphasized here, and as sociologists 
have also argued, civil society can be a force for pressuring the state to be more 
responsive to citizens and more equitable, or can be a source of exclusion and the 
reproduction of inequalities (Baiocchi, Heller and Silva, 2011).  Civil society will also 
typically work very differently under more and less democratic regimes. 
 
In general, aid should not be focused on “money”.  This can be counter-productive 
(for reasons mentioned above).  Rather, external partners can provide technical 
assistance in designing locally-grown interventions; they can play a role in financing 
information-gathering by local NGOs (e.g. Pratham and ASER); and can finance 
experimental interventions (and their learning). Most valuable is likely to be 
support for a domestic process of innovation and learning involving a generalized 
approach of experimentation—of which RCTs are one, but only one, component.   
 
Can aid ever lead to transformational changes in accountability relations?  Almost 
certainly not, if designs are hatched and brought in from outside.  However, aid can 
potentially provide a supporting role if it is aligned with the flow of internal 
initiatives, is consistent with domestic political strategy, and supports greater 
accountability at the margins of major projects.  Our analysis supports the view that 
recognition of the systemic features of state behavior is fundamental to interpreting 
the development process.  An aspiration to effect some form of system change is 
admirable, for both internal and external actors.  But for donors this needs to be 
blended with humility over the limits and unintended consequences of external 
action, and a central focus on helping domestic actors learn by doing. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has reviewed the potential role of civil society action in increasing the 
accountability of the state for development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It has focused in 
particular on the question of whether states can be induced to more effectively 
deliver the broad range of public goods needed for development, from credible 
policy commitments for business to universal quality education.  It has argued that 
this question has to be understood in the context of the overall political economy of 
African societies, and the way in which civil society is constituted and functions. 
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There has been substantial change in African polities in the past two decades, with 
fewer totally despotic states, a remarkable expansion in democracy, and fewer 
countries mired in internal conflict.  But most states remain deeply clientelistic, or 
personalistic, or riven along identity lines. State apparatuses typically have weak 
internal accountability mechanisms, and are sometimes predatory on the citizens.  
Democratic countries are typically characterized by “competitive clientelism”. Many 
countries hold elections but are still intermediate, semi-authoritarian regimes. 
Africa is by no means unique in these respects. 
 
We have argued that there is a potential role for civil society action in these 
contexts.  The most important domain for greater accountability is via power and 
politics.  If politicians, and especially leaders, do not have the incentives to deliver 
on development, putting extra pressure on bureaucratic state agencies is likely to 
have limited, or local effects. When the political leadership has some commitment to 
development, civil society may have a role to play in how internal state mechanisms 
work, including in front-line interactions. 
 
However, civil society actors are themselves part of unequal societal structures, in 
terms of the capacity for collective action, the potential to influence the state, and 
the extent to which they seek to further general development goals.  The variation in 
civil society is important to both understanding and designing its role in increasing 
accountability.  Moreover, whether civil society engagement will be effective will 
also depend on whether there is salient information on state performance, 
resolution of collective action issues among citizens, and on the existence of 
effective sanctions.  With the partial exception of very local interactions (and violent 
or peaceful revolutionary changes), immediate sanctions will depend on the 
activation of complementary within-state accountability mechanisms. 
 
The review of evidence on specific civil society interventions further underlines the 
conclusion that effects will be uncertain and contingent.  While there are a large 
number of potentially valuable initiatives underway, only relatively few have been 
carefully evaluated, especially in the domain of politics, and results have been 
mixed. 
 
The implication is that generalized, “best practice” initiatives for greater civil society 
engagement are likely to fail.  There is a strong prima facie case for greater action, 
but it is important that this be both organic—building on existing political and civil 
society structures—and experimental—structured for careful monitoring and 
assessment of how interventions work in practice and their impact.  This applies 
with particular force to the strategies and support provided by external actors.  
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Table 1: 
Civil Society Activity Across Countries: Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008 
Country  Percentage of Respondents Answering “Yes” to: 
 
Voted in 
last 
elections 
Active 
member of 
a group 
Often 
attended 
group 
meetings 
Often 
joined 
others 
to raise 
an issue 
Willing to 
demonstrate 
or protest 
Punishment 
likely if 
people 
complain 
Polity IV Score Between 10 and 6 (“full democracies”) 
South Africa  65  16  29  20  45  46 
Botswana  59  17  55  39  52  19 
Lesotho  61  28  67  50  52  74 
Ghana   81  35  40  38  30  32 
Senegal  79  28  60  55  62  60 
Mali  77  29  57  55  59  46 
Kenya  79  43  44  35  40  37 
Benin  91  23  53  50  65  25 
Zambia  59  24  45  33  45  47 
Liberia  78  45  50  42  24  40 
Malawi  75  22  60  54  50  27 
Avg:  73.09  28.18  50.91  42.82  47.64  41.18 
Polity IV Score Between 6 and 2: 
Mozambique  60  18  49  45  57  47 
Nigeria  60  27  30  26  43  57 
Avg:   60  22.5  39.5  35.5  50  52 
Polity IV Score Between 2 and -2: 
Zimbabwe  61  16  51  38  42  44 
Madagascar  70  4  75  29  20  61 
Burkina  72  18  59  52  63  53 
Uganda  70  31  44  33  35  41 
Tanzania  82  35  64  51  65  57 
Avg:  71  20.80  58.6  40.6  45  51.2 
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Literature Review 
(Prepared by Avnish Gungadurdoss) 
Paper Title  Country/ 
Region 
Leg of 
Triangle  
Mechanism   How  Role played by 
civil society 
actors 
Nature of 
Analysis 
Category 
of 
findings 
Measured 
Impacts 
Abstract 
Katherine Casey, 
Rachel 
Glennerster, 
Edward Miguel, 
Experimental 
Evidence on 
External Aid and 
Community 
Institutions in 
Sierra Leone, JPAL 
working papers 
Sierra 
Leone 
Compact, 
Client 
Power, 
Politics 
Solving 
collective 
action 
problems 
Provided an 
opportunitiy 
for collective 
enterprise, 
founded on 
democratic 
institutions 
meant to 
empower the  
marginalized. 
The hope 
then is that 
those 
artificial 
institutions 
would spill 
over onto 
existing 
norms. 
This was a 
government 
initiative in line 
with the post-
conflict 
decentralization 
strategy: 
Facilitators 
introduced 
practices aimed 
at making local 
decision-
making more 
democratic.  
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
1) Improved 
service delivery 
(public goods) 
but no 
distinction are 
made regarding 
the channels 
(addressing 
accountability 
or simply 
higher input of 
resources)                                   
2) No impact on 
village-level 
institutions 
(inclusiveness 
in decision-
making, better 
collective 
action ability, 
etc..) 
Abstract: Institutional performance is 
thought to be a key determinant of economic 
success, however there is little evidence on 
how best to reform existing institutions. 
Foreign aid donors spend substantial 
resources on ―community driven 
development programs that combine the 
provision of public goods with intensive long 
term facilitation designed to strengthen local 
institutions; make them more democratic and 
inclusive of marginalized social groups; and 
enhance the capacity of communities to 
engage in collective action. This paper 
evaluates the effectiveness of one such 
program in post-war Sierra Leone using a 
randomized methodology. Data collection 
combined rich survey instruments with a set 
of novel structured community activities 
designed to measure how real world 
collective action and participation changed 
over the four year program (2005-2009). We 
find positive impacts on the establishment of 
local development committees, local public 
goods provision, links between communities 
and local government officials, household 
economic welfare, and village-level market 
activity. However, we do not find any 
program impacts on community social 
norms, the role of women and youths in local 
affairs, more egalitarian decision making or 
the capacity for collective action beyond the 
immediate project sphere. Overall, these 
findings suggest that community driven 
development programs and related donor 
projects may leave communities materially 
better off but may be less effective in 
fundamentally transforming local institutions 
or power dynamics.  
Abhijit Banerjee, 
Esther Duflo, 
“Addressing 
Absence” The 
Journal of 
Economic 
THIS PAPER REVIEWS THE NEXT 3 STUDIES DESCRIBED IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW:    Perspectives, Vol. 
20, No. 1 (Winter, 
2006), pp. 117-132  
Duflo, Esther and 
Rema Hanna. 
2005. "Monitoring 
Works: Getting 
Teachers to Come 
to School." Mimeo, 
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology 
India  Compact 
Financial 
sanctions 
and benefits 
Linking 
bonus and 
penalties to 
attendance 
rate, recorded 
using tamper-
proof 
cameras 
NGO (Seva 
Mandir) 
monitored 
teacher 
attendance with 
the help of 
clients - 
children in 
school in charge 
of taking 
pictures 
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Increased 
teacher 
attendance and 
children-days 
The RCT’s treatment was to link teacher’s 
bonuses and penalties to their attendance 
levels. Using cameras with tamper-proof date 
and time function to monitor daily 
attendance, the experiment decreased 
absence rate by half. When in school, 
teachers were as likely to teach in both 
control and treatment groups. Despite that, 
given increases in teacher attendance, the 
number of children-days taught in treatment 
increased by one third. In addition, given 
structure of the pay, the average salary in the 
two groups was almost equal. The cost of the 
cameras and administration of the program 
amounted to $6 per child per year for an 
increase of over 30 percent in the number of 
days the child is taught,  
Kremer, Michael 
and Daniel Chen. 
2001. "An Interim 
Report on a 
Teacher 
Attendance 
Incentive Program 
in Kenya." Mimeo, 
Harvard University 
Kenya  Compact 
Financial 
sanctions 
and benefits 
Linking 
bonus to 
attendence 
rate - 
monitoring 
and 
distribution 
done by 
headmaster  
NGO (ICS 
Africa) funded 
and 
implemented 
the incentive 
system   
RCT  None  No effect 
This experiment explored the idea of 
boosting teacher attendance with a prize (a 
bicycle). The allocation of the prize was to 
be determined by the headmaster. In all 
treatment schools, the headmasters marked 
the preschool teachers present a sufficient 
number of times for them to receive the prize 
(and they therefore all got it). However, 
when the research team independently 
verified absence through unannounced visits 
in both treatment and comparison schools, 
they found that the absence rate was actually 
at exactly the same high level in treatment 
and in comparison schools. Either to avoid 
the unpleasantness of a personal 
confrontation, or out of compassion for the 
preschool teachers, headmasters apparently 
cheated to make sure that the preschool 
teachers could get the prizes. This outcome 
suggests that when human judgment is 
involved in a system where rules are often 
bent, incentives may easily be perverted, 
either as in this case in an equitable direction 
or to favor some specific individuals or 
groups. Glewwe, Paul, 
Nauman Ilias and 
Michael Kremer. 
2003. "Teacher 
Incentives." 
Mimeo, Harvard 
University 
Kenya  Compact 
Financial 
sanctions 
and benefits 
Linking 
bonus to 
objective 
performance 
measures  
NGO (ICS 
Africa) funded 
and 
implemented 
the incentive 
system   
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Improved 
service delivery 
as measured by 
short-term 
outcomes (test 
scores) but no 
effect on long-
term 
educational 
outcomes.   
The Kenyan experiment provides incentives 
to teachers based on the test scores of 
students in their class. ICS Africa (NGO) 
provided prizes to teachers in grades 4 to 8 
based on the performance of the school as a 
whole on the district exams in each year. All 
teachers who taught these grades were 
eligible for the prize. Prizes were awarded in 
two categories: "Top-scoring schools" and 
"Most-improved schools." Schools could not 
win in more than one category. 
Improvements were calculated relative to 
performance in the base-line year. In each 
category, three first, second, third and fourth 
prizes were awarded. Out of the 50 schools 
participating in the program, 24 received 
prizes of some type, and teachers in most 
schools should have felt that they had a 
chance of winning a prize. Prizes ranged in 
value from 21 to 43 percent of typical 
teacher monthly salaries.                                                                                                                            
The comparison of the 50 treatment and 50 
control schools suggested that this program 
did improve performance in the district 
exams (by about 0.14 standard deviations), 
but had no effect on teacher attendance. 
Instead, the teachers held more test 
preparation sessions. This, the authors 
conclude, was rational based on the (limited) 
evidence on what is most effective in 
improving test scores over the short horizon. 
However, these preparation sessions are 
probably poor substitutes for regular classes. 
This method of pushing up test scores did 
little for long-term learning, as evidenced by 
the fact that once the program ended, 
students who had been in the program 
schools did not out-perform those in control 
schools. The lesson from this experiment 
seems to be that if we want to boost teacher 
attendance by providing incentives for 
teachers, the incentive must be tied directly 
to attendance. Incentives help teachers get a 
better sense of what their objectives are and 
will lead them to focus on the most painless 
way to achieve this particular objective 
 
 Banerjee, Abhijit, 
Angus Deaton and 
Esther Duflo. 
2004a. "Health 
Care Delivery in 
Rural Rajasthan." 
Economic and 
Political Weekly. 
39:9, pp. 944-49.  
India  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information            
2) Financial 
sanctions 
and benefits 
Disseminatin
g information 
on attendance 
on weekly 
basis 
Community 
member 
individually 
monitored 
health 
employees and 
reporting to 
other 
community 
members 
RCT  None  No effect 
The experiment explores if and how villagers 
organize themselves to discipline service 
providers upon provision of monitoring 
information regarding the attendance rates of 
the service providers. A member of the 
community was paid to check once a week, 
on unannounced days, whether the auxiliary 
nurse-midwife assigned to the health sub-
center was present in the center, and if she 
was not there, whether she could be found in 
the village. A parallel system (a monthly 
visit by a member of the survey team, on the 
same day) confirmed that this system of local 
monitoring was properly implemented: 
external monitors and community members 
found similar absence rates. However, no 
attempt was made to impose an external 
reward system for the nurse-midwives based 
on the monitoring information. The idea 
behind this experiment was to let the 
villagers choose how they would use the 
monitoring information they were 
generating. For example, the villagers could 
choose to put explicit pressure on the nurse-
midwife or try to shame her by exposing her 
absences. They could even promise her some 
explicit rewards. In this case, the collective 
action problem in monitoring stood in the 
way of effective local control. 
Martina Björkman, 
Jakob Svensson 
(2007) “Power to 
the People: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Field 
Experiment of a 
Community-Based 
Monitoring Project 
in Uganda” Policy 
Research Working 
Paper Series 4268, 
The World Bank 
Uganda  Client 
Power 
1) Solving 
collective 
action 
problems         
2) Improved 
information  
Disseminate 
information 
on 
community’s 
entitlements, 
aggregate 
outcomes, 
status of 
health service 
delivery 
compared to 
other 
communities 
& external 
support by 
local NGO in 
addressing 
the free-rider 
problem of 
monitoring 
by increasing 
Community-
based 
organizations 
facilitated 
initial 
dessemination 
of report cards 
at community 
meetings. They 
also guided 
community 
members in 
designing a 
monitoring plan 
and revising it 
midway 
through the 
program 
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
The quantity of 
services 
delivered 
increases 
Strengthening the relationship of 
accountability between health service 
providers and citizens is by many people 
viewed as critical for improving access to 
and quality of health care. How this is to be 
achieved, and whether it works, however, 
remain open questions. This paper presents a 
randomized field experiment on increasing 
community-based monitoring. As 
communities began to more extensively 
monitor the provider, both the quality and 
quantity of health service provision 
improved. One year into the program, we 
find large increases in utilization, significant 
weight-for-age z-score gains of infants, and 
markedly lower deaths among children. The 
findings on state’s behavior suggest that the 
improvements in quality and quantity of 
health service delivery resulted from an 
increased effort by the state to serve the 
community. Overall, the results suggest that organizationa
l capacity and 
encouraging 
communities 
to develop 
their own 
monitoring 
strategy that 
they could 
manage and 
sustain 
community monitoring can play an important 
role in improving service delivery when 
traditional top-down supervision is 
ineffective. 
Martina Björkman 
& Jakob Svensson 
(2010) "When Is 
Community-Based 
Monitoring 
Effective? Evidence 
from a Randomized 
Experiment in 
Primary Health in 
Uganda," Journal 
of the European 
Economic 
Association, MIT 
Press, vol. 8(2-3), 
pages 571-581, 04-
05. 
Follow up on 
above study 
Uganda  Client 
Power 
1) Solving 
collection 
action 
problem 
same as 
above  same as above  RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
The 
improvement in 
services is 
largest for the 
most 
homogenous 
communities, 
signifying that 
there is a 
greater ability 
to coordinate 
collective 
action within 
ethnic groups as 
compared to 
across ethnic 
groups. 
This is a follow-up examination of the above 
experiment (Bjorkman, Svensson 2009) 
focusing on the effect of communities’ social 
heterogeneity on their ability to address the 
collective action problem. Evidence reveals 
substantial heterogeneous treatment effects 
within the treated group. Using data from the 
randomized experiment in primary health in 
Uganda (described above), the authors test 
whether social heterogeneity can explain 
why some treated communities managed to 
push for better health service delivery while 
others did not. The results suggest that 
income inequality, and particularly ethnic 
fractionalization, adversely impact collective 
action for improved service provision. 
Mary Kay Gugerty 
and Michael 
Kremer, “Outside 
Funding and the 
Dynamics of 
Participation in 
Community 
Associations”, 
American Journal 
of Political 
Science, Vol. 52, 
No. 3 (Jul., 2008), 
pp. 585-602 
Kenya 
Group 
Formation 
Client 
power 
1) Solving 
collection 
action 
problem 
External 
funding for 
local 
women's 
associations 
International 
NGO 
(International 
Child Support) 
provided 
assistance in the 
form of 
agricultural 
inputs, 
organizational 
and group 
management 
training and 
agricultural 
training in the 
hope of 
strengthening 
the group 
membership  
RCT 
Shifts in 
inequalitie
s of 
access/infl
uence 
1) Outside 
funding did not 
expand 
organizational 
strength,                                                                    
2) 
Substantial evid
ence  that 
funding 
changed group 
membership 
and leadership, 
weakening the 
role of the 
disadvantaged. 
The poor and disadvantaged are widely seen 
as having weak organizations and low rates 
of participation in community associations, 
impeding their political representation and 
economic advancement. Many policy 
initiatives aim to build civic participation 
among the disadvantaged by funding local 
community associations. Taking advantage 
of random assignment in a program 
supporting women's community associations 
in Kenya, we find little evidence that outside 
funding expanded organizational strength, 
but substantial evidence that funding 
changed group membership and leadership, 
weakening the role of the disadvantaged. The 
program led younger, more educated, and 
better-off women to enter the groups. New 
entrants, men, and more educated women 
assumed leadership positions. The departure 
of older women, the most socially 
marginalized demographic group, increased substantially. The results are generalized 
through a formal model showing how 
democratic decision making by existing 
members of community associations can 
generate long-run outcomes in which the 
poor and disadvantaged either do not belong 
to any associations or belong to weak 
organizations. 
NGO REPORT 
(2004) “Rural 
Initiatives and 
Relief Agency 
(RIRA) – Report 
for a Pilot Public 
Expenditure 
Tracking in 10 
Villages of Magu 
District”. 
Partnership for 
Transparency. 
Tanzania  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
External 
support by 
NGO 
Local NGO 
RIRA 
undertook 
public 
expenditure 
tracking 
Qualitativ
e 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
1) The project 
was effective in 
those villages in 
ensuring that 
commitments to 
deliver funds 
for health and 
education were 
met. 
In Tanzania, corruption posed a threat to 
successful implementation of poverty 
reduction strategies.  To tackle this problem, 
the government undertook public 
expenditure reviews (PER) in priority areas 
such as education and health. Given the 
highly participatory environment under 
which the country had undertaken its strategy 
and reform process, in 2004 a local NGO—
the Rural Initiatives and Relief Agency 
(RIRA)—undertook a pilot funded by the 
Partnership for Transparency Fund to track 
public expenditures. Without public access to 
information on local government budgets and 
spending, officials cannot be held 
accountable. The NGO saw a need in 
Tanzania—where local government 
authorities must disseminate information on 
revenues and expenditures—to develop a 
model for effective monitoring and 
evaluation in villages. There was particular 
emphasis on education, which represents the 
largest disbursement to villages. 
•  According  to  a  RIRA  survey,  only  10 
percent of villagers had seen information on 
education or health spending, required by 
law. The project found that communities 
were not involved in decision-making, 
received little information, and cannot easily 
lodge grievances. 
•  In  2004,  the  pilot-program assisted 
communities in track government 
disbursements for health and education 
development for ten villages in the Magu 
district. 
• A replicable model for public expenditure 
tracking was built. 
•  The  project  mobilized  community 
participation in public expenditure tracking. Trang Nguyen, 
Gerard Lassibille, 
Improving 
Management in 
Education: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized 
Experiment in 
Madagascar, MIT 
Poverty Action Lab 
Working Paper, 
June 2008 
Madagas
car 
Compact 
v/s Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information            
2) 
Leveraging 
social 
sanctions 
through 
regular 
meetings 
between 
school 
teachers and 
parents 
1) External 
support by 
Government, 
in terms of 
training for 
district and 
sub-district 
administrator
s and teachers 
as well as to 
structure 
parents-
teachers 
meetings 
Group of 
parents 
(beneficiaries) 
attended 
meetings where 
report cards of 
teacher 
performance 
were 
distributed, 
giving 
credibility to 
the social 
sanction 
mechanism at 
play.  
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
1) Top-down 
monitoring by 
district and sub-
district 
administrators 
had no 
significant 
impacts                                   
2) Beneficiary 
monitoring 
improved test 
scores by 0.1 
standard 
deviations after 
2 years and 
teacher's 
behavior 
improved in 
lesson planning 
and giving 
evaluations. 
Tasks that did 
were not 
specifically 
measured, such 
as teacher 
attendance or 
communication 
with parents, 
did not 
improve. 
This paper evaluates several interventions in 
Madagascar that sought to promote top-down 
and local monitoring of the school to 
improve education quality. Randomly 
selected school districts and subdistricts 
received operational tools to facilitate the 
administrators’ supervision tasks. Randomly 
selected schools in these treated districts 
were reinforced with teacher tools and 
parent-teacher meetings centered around a 
school report card. The other schools in 
treated districts did not receive any direct 
intervention; it was up to the administrators 
to distribute the report cards and tools, and 
implement effective monitoring in those 
places. We find little impact of targeting 
district and subdistrict administrators on their 
behavior and on the performance of the 
schools under their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, 
the intervention implemented at the school 
level led to an improvement in various 
observable performance measures. Teachers 
prepared lesson plans and evaluated their 
students more frequently. Teacher attendance 
and communication with parents did not 
improve, consistent with predictions of the 
multitasking principal-agent problem. On 
balance, the effect of the school intervention 
on student attendance was positive: 4.3 
percentage point increase from 87% mean 
attendance. Test scores also improved by 0.1 
standard deviations after two years, 
particularly in math and Malagasy. These 
results suggest that improving management 
via mediated control in the hands of 
government bureaucrats does not do much in 
this context, while beneficiary monitoring 
leads to an improvement in teaching 
activities and student achievement. 
Reinikka, R. and 
Svensson, J. 2005. 
“Fighting 
Corruption to 
Improve Schooling: 
Evidence from a 
Newspaper 
Campaign in 
Uganda.” Journal 
of the European 
Economic 
Uganda  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
1) 
Information 
on central 
grant 
disbursal 
published 
monthly by 
the 
government 
to increase 
awareness of 
  
Economet
ric - IV 
estimation 
and 
difference
-in- 
difference 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Public 
Expenditure 
Tracking 
surveys, when 
made public 
and linked to 
public 
information 
campaigns, can 
contribute to 
reducing 
This paper demonstrates that public service 
capture of government funds should increase 
as information regarding funding becomes 
more available to the public. The author 
studied central government funding received 
by public schools in Uganda after a 1996 
newspaper campaign to provide grant 
information to schools and parents. Average 
school capture of central government grants 
increased from 20% before the campaign to 
80% in 2001. As teachers demonstrated more Association 3 (2-
3): 259-267. 
parents and 
schools 
leakages in 
delivery of 
service sector 
budgets locally 
knowledge of grant capture in a survey 
conducted during the study and as the 
distance to a newspaper stand from the 
school decreased, the percent of grant money 
captured by the school increased. 
Hubbard, P. (2007) 
‘Putting the Power 
of Transparency in 
Context: 
Information’s Role 
in Reducing 
Corruption in 
Uganda’s 
Education Sector.’ 
Working Paper 
Number 136. 
Washington, DC: 
Center for Global 
Development. 
Available at 
http://www.cgdev.o
rg/content/publicati
ons/detail/15050/  
Uganda 
THIS PAPER OFFERS A DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE RENIKKA AND 
SVENSSON PAPER DESCRIBED ABOVE --> More specifically it claims that 
there were concurring changes in Politics and Compact as well.  
"It is a mistake 
to attribute the 
entire reduction 
in corruption to 
a single 
publication 
policy. 
Reinikka and 
Svennson's 
research 
focuses on a 
small but 
significant 
element - 
information 
provided 
through 
newspapers to 
local schools. 
But their 
research is best 
understood in 
terms of 
concurrent 
reforms in 
Uganda's 
education and 
fiscal systems. 
This paper 
examines a 
number of other 
policies and 
reforms that 
help explain the 
reported decline 
in corruption to 
Ugandan 
education in the 
1990s." 
One of the popular stories told (and taught) 
in development circles is how corruption was 
slashed in Uganda simply by publishing the 
amount of monthly grants to schools. This 
paper takes a deeper look at the facts behind 
the Uganda story and finds that while 
information did indeed play a critical role, 
the story is much more complicated than we 
have been led to believe. A dramatic drop did 
occur in the percentage of funds being 
diverted from Uganda’s capitation grant. But 
to attribute this leakage solely to the monthly 
release of grant data by the government risks 
ignoring the major funding in which this 
transparency campaign was imbedded Tsai, L. L, 
“Solidary groups, 
informal 
accountability, and 
local public goods 
provision in rural 
china”,  2007, 
American Political 
Science Review 
101, (02): 355-72.  
China 
Client 
Power 
and/or 
Local 
Politics  
Social 
Sanctions /  
Benefits 
This is a 
model of 
informal 
government 
accountability 
whereby 
citizens 
award public 
official with  
valuable  
'moral 
standing' for 
above 
average 
performance 
and hence 
incentivize 
public good 
provision 
Villagers create 
and leverage 
encompassing 
and powerful 
social networks 
(such as 
religious 
groups) to 
sanction/ 
incentivize 
local officials 
and elected 
representatives 
  
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
In the absence 
of strong 
institutions and  
in the presence 
of weak formal 
accountability 
systems, 
embedding 
public officials 
or elected 
representatives 
in 
encompassing 
social groups 
(solidary 
groups) lead to 
higher levels of 
public good 
provision. 
Why would government officials in 
authoritarian and transitional systems where 
formal democratic and bureaucratic 
institutions of accountability are often weak 
ever provide more than the minimum level of 
public goods needed to maintain social 
stability? Findings from a unique 
combination of in-depth case study research 
and an original survey of 316 
villages in rural China indicate that even 
when formal accountability is weak., local 
officials can be subject to unofficial rules and 
norms that establish and enforce their public 
obligations. These informal institutions of 
accountability can be provided by 
encompassing and embedding solidary 
groups. Villages where these types of groups 
exist are more likely to have better local 
governmental public goods provision than 
villages without these solidary groups, all 
other things being equal  
WORLD BANK 
REPORT: "Paying 
Primary Health 
Care Centers for 
Performance in 
Rwanda", Policy 
Research Working 
Paper 5190. 
Rwanda  Compact 
Increased 
Monitoring/ 
Incentive 
systems 
Linking 
payment to 
performance, 
measured by 
quantity and 
quality 
indicators 
n/a 
Difference
-in-
difference 
Improved 
service 
delivery 
Pay for 
performance 
incentivizes 
providers to 
increase service 
delivery (where 
possible) and 
also increase 
quality of 
services. In 
addition, when 
particular 
services (such 
as deliveries) 
are rewarded 
better than 
others, there is 
evidence of 
greater effort to 
increase quality 
and also 
outreach in 
those services, 
through health 
care providers. 
Thus, if 
designed 
properly, P4P 
can be targeted 
Paying for performance (P4P) provides 
financial incentives for providers to increase 
the use and quality of care. P4P can affect 
health care by providing incentives for 
providers to put more effort into specific 
activities, and by increasing the amount of 
resources available to finance the delivery of 
services. This paper evaluates the impact of 
P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, 
institutional delivery, and child preventive 
care using data produced from a prospective 
quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the 
national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment 
facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 
2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled 
two years later. The incentive effect is 
isolated from the resource effect by 
increasing comparison facilities’ input-based 
budgets by the average P4P payments to the 
treatment facilities. The data were collected 
from 166 facilities and a random sample of 
2158 households. P4P had a large and 
significant positive impact on institutional 
deliveries and preventive care visits by 
young children, and improved quality of 
prenatal care. The authors find no effect on 
the number of prenatal care visits or on 
immunization rates. P4P had the greatest 
effect on those services that had the highest to improve 
specific 
services. 
payment rates and needed the lowest 
provider effort. P4P financial performance 
incentives can improve both the use of and 
the quality of health services. Because the 
analysis isolates the incentive effect from the 
resource effect in P4P, the results indicate 
that an equal amount of financial resources 
without the incentives would not have 
achieved the same gain in outcomes. 
Barret Gregory 
and Gaventa John, 
"So what difference 
does it make? 
Mapping the 
outcomes of Citizen 
Engagement", IDS 
Working Paper 
Volume 2010 
Number 347 
Various  Various 
Various 
types of 
citizen 
engagement  
n/a   n/a 
Qualitativ
e - 
Synthesis 
of 100 
studies 
n/a 
Maps positive 
and negative 
outcomes of 
citizenship 
engagement 
initiatives into 4 
different 
categories and 
offers an insight 
on future 
approach to 
citizen 
engagement - 
Very good 
summary of 
qualitative 
literature  
In this paper, we report on a meta-case study 
analysis of a ten-year research programme on 
citizenship, participation and accountability, 
which analysed a nonrandomized sample of 
100 research studies of four types of citizen 
engagement in 20 countries. By mapping the 
observable effects of citizen participation 
through a close reading of these studies, we 
created a typology of four democratic and 
developmental outcomes, including (a) the 
construction of citizenship, (b) the 
strengthening of practices of participation, 
(c) the strengthening of responsive and 
accountable states, and (d) the development 
of inclusive and cohesive societies. We find 
that citizen participation produces positive 
effects across these outcome types, though in 
each category there are also examples of 
negative outcomes of citizen participation. 
We also find that these outcomes vary 
according to the type of citizen engagement 
and to political context. These findings have 
important implications for the design of and 
support for participatory programmes meant 
to improve state responsiveness and 
effectiveness. 
Mcgee, Rosemary, 
Gaventa John 
(2010) “Review of 
Impact and 
Effectiveness of 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Initiatives: 
Synthesis Report”, 
Institute of 
Development 
Studies 
ALL STUDIES LISTED BELOW ARE DRAWN FROM THE MCGEE, GAVENTA Synthesis Report    Ravindra, A. 
(2004) ‘An 
Assessment of the 
Impact of 
Bangalore Citizen 
Report Cards on 
the Performance of 
Public Agencies.’ 
Evaluation 
Capacity 
Development 
Working Paper 
no.12, Operations 
Evaluation 
Department. 
Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
India  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
User 
feedback in 
Report cards 
can be used 
to hold public 
officials 
accountable 
Citizens report 
grievances and 
civil societies 
and NGOs 
increase their 
level of 
activism using 
grievances to 
hold public 
officials and 
local 
government 
accountable 
Qualitativ
e 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Improved 
quality of 
services 
through 
increased civic 
activism, 
increased public 
awareness and 
increased client 
orientation on 
the part of 
Public Service 
Agencies 
This review finds that citizen report cards 
have been an important vehicle for civil 
society action  in Bangalore, and that they 
have had a significant impact on the quality 
of public services. The review identifies 
success factors and considers the replicability 
of the report card approach. 2 citizen Report 
Cards, in 1994 and 1999, collected citizen's 
feedback on the performance of 8 major 
Public Service Agencies in Bangalore. The 
study conducts targeted interviews with 
NGOs and  to assess the role of and extent to 
which report cards align public officials' 
performance with public needs.  
Caseley, J. (2003) 
‘Blocked Drains 
and Open Minds: 
Multiple 
Accountability 
Relationships and 
Improved Service 
Delivery 
Performance in an 
Indian City.’ IDS 
Working Paper 
211. Brighton, UK: 
Institute of 
Development 
Studies. 
India 
Client 
Power and 
Compact 
1) Improved 
information           
2) Providing 
a compact 
with greater 
independenc
e from 
politicians 
and better 
performance 
measuremen
t            
1) Senior 
Managers and 
front-line 
providers 
organize 
meetings with 
citizens to 
identify needs 
2) Citizens 
also lodge 
complaints 
through 
formal 
system to 
increase 
information 
flow                                             
3) The extent 
to which 
complaints 
are addressed 
is used as a 
measurement 
of 
performance 
n/a  Case-
study 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Complaint 
mechanisms 
can contribute 
to reduction of 
corruption, by 
linking citizens 
directly to 
managers who 
can then hold 
managers to 
account 
How can public sector service providers 
deliver improved services to citizens within 
environments where inefficient and often 
corrupt service delivery is the norm? The 
following paper provides some answers to 
this question through examining the impact 
of a series of customer-focused service 
delivery reforms undertaken at the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board (Metro Water) in 
Hyderabad City, Andhra Pradesh state, 
Southern India at the end of the 1990s. The 
Metro Water case is interesting, as it shows 
how a semi-autonomous service provider can 
undertake organisational change and realise 
sustained improvements in service delivery 
performance. If this process is deepened over 
time there is a greater opportunity to attract, 
and provide security for, larger state or 
private sector investments that can impact 
water supply and sewerage service delivery 
over the long-term. This is the scenario that 
emerges in the following case. A key finding 
in this research is that multiple accountability 
relationships, operating between external 
actors and Metro Water staff, have 
collectively contributed to sustained 
organisational change and improved service 
delivery performance. The most critical of 
these relationships are those that triangulate 
between citizens, senior managers, and 
ìfront-lineî workers. In the Metro Water case 
active citizen engagement through formal accountability mechanisms has been the key 
to the organisationís overall success in 
delivering improved services to citizens 
(both middle class and urban poor) 
throughout Hyderabad City. 
Banerjee, A., 
Duflo, E., 
Glennerster, R., 
Banerji, R. and 
Khemani, S. (2010) 
‘Pitfalls of 
Participatory 
Programs: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized 
Evaluation of 
Education in 
India.’ American 
Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 
2(1): 1-30.                              
India  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information                              
Provision of 
information, 
training of 
community 
members and 
supplementin
g public 
education 
system with a 
parallel 
remedial one 
motored by 
volunteers. 
External 
support in 
experimental 
setting 
RCT  None 
Information 
provision has 
been found to 
have little 
impact by itself 
on the level of 
engagement by 
citizens in 
engaging for 
accountability 
with school 
systems in one 
study. There is 
evidence that 
citizens are 
constrained and 
cannot 
participate in 
improving the 
education 
system. This 
highlights the 
regressive 
nature of 
participatory 
approaches and 
also may reflect 
the free rider 
problem 
Participation of beneficiaries in the 
monitoring of public services is increasingly 
seen as a key to improving their efficiency. 
In India, the current  government flagship 
program on universal primary education 
organizes both locally elected leaders and 
parents of children enrolled in public schools 
into committees and gives these groups 
powers over resource allocation, and 
monitoring and management of school 
performance. However, in a baseline survey 
we found that people were not aware of the 
existence of these committees and their 
potential for improving education. This paper 
evaluates three different interventions to 
encourage beneficiaries’ participation 
through these committees: providing 
information, training community members in 
a new testing tool, and training and 
organizing volunteers to hold remedial 
reading camps for illiterate children. We find 
that these interventions had no impact on 
community involvement in public  schools, 
and no impact on teacher effort or learning 
outcomes in those schools. However, we do 
find that the intervention that trained 
volunteers to teach children to read had a 
large impact on activity outside public 
schools—local youths volunteered to be 
trained to teach, and children who attended 
these camps substantially improved their 
reading skills. These results suggest that 
citizens face substantial constraints in 
participating to improve the public education 
system, even when they care about education 
and are willing to do something to improve 
it. Pandey, P., Goyal, 
S. and 
Sundararaman, V. 
(2009) 'Community 
Participation in 
Public Schools: 
Impact of 
Information 
Campaigns in 
Three Indian 
States', Education 
Economics 17(3): 
287-89.  
India  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
Information 
was given to 
increase the 
awareness of  
parents and 
community 
members on 
important 
processes that 
influence the 
quality of 
schools. Thus 
parents were 
empowered 
to engage 
with the 
school system 
(with 
teachers, 
committees, 
funding 
process, etc..) 
and hold it 
accountable. 
Citizens act 
upon 
information to 
pressurize 
school system 
RCT 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
When 
information 
provision is tied 
to a 
community–
based 
information 
campaign, 
positive impacts 
were found on 
citizen 
engagement, 
teacher 
engagement and 
scholastic 
outcomes in 
UP, MP and 
Karnataka 
This study evaluates the impact of a 
community-based information campaign on 
school performance from a cluster 
randomized control trial in 610 villages. The 
campaign consisted of eight or nine public 
meetings in each of 340 treatment villages 
across three Indian states to disseminate 
information to the community about its state-
mandated roles and responsibilities in school 
management. No intervention took place in 
control villages. At baseline there are no 
significant differences in school outcomes. 
This paper reports on the first follow up 
survey that took place two to four months 
after the intervention. We find that providing 
information through a structured campaign to 
communities had a positive impact in all 
three states. However, there are differences 
across states in where the impact occurs. The 
most notable impacts occurred on teacher 
effort, while impacts on learning were more 
modest. Some improvements also occurred 
in the delivery of benefits entitled to students 
(stipend, uniform and mid-day meal) and in 
process variables such as community 
participation in each of the three states. 
Future research needs to examine whether 
there is a systematic increase in learning 
when the impact is measured over a longer 
time period and whether a campaign 
sustained over longer duration generates 
greater impact on school outcomes. Goldfrank, B. 
(2006) ‘Lessons 
from Latin 
American 
Experience in 
Participatory 
Budgeting.’ Paper 
Presented at the 
Latin American 
Studies Association 
Meeting, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, 
March.                                                                                                 
Available at 
http://www.internat
ionalbudget.org/the
mes/PB/LatinAmer
ica.pdf  
Multiple, 
but 
largely 
Brazil or 
Latin 
America 
Politics, 
Client 
Power 
Involve 
clients in 
decision-
making on 
budgets 
  
Citizens 
participate in 
decision-
making of 
municipalities 
and other 
government 
units on 
budgets. 
Case-
study 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
Participatory 
budgeting 
initiatives can 
contribute to 
multiple 
outcomes, 
including 
improved 
public services, 
re-direction of 
resources to 
poor 
communities, 
new civic 
associations, 
etc., 
strengthened 
democratic 
processes, etc., 
but there are 
also 
contradictory 
findings in 
some settings 
Whether this diffusion of Participatory 
Budgeting (PB) is seen as cause for 
celebration or cause for alarm should depend 
on both how PB is interpreted and how it is 
being implemented in its new environs. 
Interpretations of PB, especially as practiced 
in Porto Alegre, the Brazilian city that named 
and publicized it, abound. Yet studies of how 
PB is practiced, especially outside of Brazil, 
are only beginning to emerge. Most 
importantly, systematic comparisons of the 
variety of ways in which PB is designed and 
implemented in practice remain exceptional. 
With the aim of contributing to this emerging 
area of scholarship, this chapter attempts a 
preliminary analysis of the more recent 
efforts at introducing participatory 
mechanisms into local government budget 
processes. After a brief section defining PB 
and outlining its history, I present the major 
normative perspectives on PB as well as a 
number of sometimes corresponding 
analytical perspectives. Combining 
arguments made in earlier work, the broad 
hypothesis I advance is that the design and, 
partially in turn, the results of PB depend on 
both the designing actors’ intentions and the 
preexisting conditions in the particular 
locale. This translates into a number of 
specific suggestions. The most important of 
these are that introducing PB is never a 
neutral political act but rather always a form 
of “competitive institution building” 
(Goldfrank and Schneider, forthcoming), and 
that the results of PB will vary tremendously. 
The next section examines these hypotheses 
through a broad comparison of national 
experiences in Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Peru. This is followed by 
analysis of case studies in fourteen non-
Brazilian municipalities. Robinson, M. 
(2006) ‘Budget 
Analysis and Policy 
Advocacy: The 
Role of Non-
governmental 
Public Action.” 
IDS Working Paper 
279. Brighton, UK: 
Institute of 
Development 
Studies.  
Multi-
country 
case 
studies 
Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information              various  various 
Case-
study/ 
Qualitativ
e 
Improved 
Service 
Delivery 
and 
redistribut
ion 
Budget 
monitoring 
initiatives can 
contribute to 
improved 
budget 
transparency 
and awareness, 
as well as 
enhanced 
resources and 
efficiency in 
expenditure 
utilization 
This paper examines the impact and 
significance of independent budget analysis 
and advocacy initiatives that are designed to 
improve budget transparency and the poverty 
focus of government expenditure priorities. It 
draws on case study research of six budget 
groups in Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Uganda, which include 
non-governmental organisations, research 
institutions and social movements. The 
findings demonstrate that civil society budget 
initiatives contribute to improvements in the 
transparency of budgetary decisions and the 
budget process, increased budget awareness 
and literacy, and deeper engagement in the 
budget process on the part of legislators, the 
media and civil society organisations. While 
the structure of the budget process makes 
substantial changes in expenditure priorities 
difficult to achieve, budget groups directly 
contribute to positive impacts on budget 
allocations and improved implementation, 
thereby increasing the accountability of 
decision-makers. Tracking of budgetary 
expenditures and impacts was also found to 
be effective in ensuring effective utilisation 
of education and health expenditures. 
Increased budget allocations and improved 
utilisation of public funds that benefit poor 
and disadvantaged groups can ensure greater 
equity in budget priorities and further social 
justice objectives. The activities of budget 
groups strengthen democracy by fostering 
accountability, enhancing transparency and 
deepening participation. 
Open Society 
Justice Initiative, 
'Transparency and 
Silence: A Survey 
of Access to 
Information Laws 
and Practices in 14 
Countries', OSJI 
2006 
14 
country 
study 
Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
Freedom of 
Information 
laws 
Citizens file 
requests to 
access 
information 
System 
Test 
(Lodging 
complaint
s and 
analyzing 
responses) 
n/a 
Freedom of 
information 
requests can 
contribute to 
responsiveness 
of public 
officials, though 
not always, and 
highly 
dependent on 
status of person 
submitting 
request and 
civil society 
pressure 
This report records and analyzes the results 
of a study in which partners of the Justice 
Initiative in 14 countries filed a total of 1,926 
requests for information. In each country, 
seven different requesters twice submitted up 
to 70 questions to 18 public institutions. 
Requesters included NGOs, journalists, 
businesspersons, non-affiliated persons, and 
members of excluded groups, such as 
illiterate or disabled persons or those from 
vulnerable minorities. The requests were for 
the types of information that public bodies 
hold—or should hold. As far as possible, no 
requests were made for classified 
information and other information that would ordinarily be exempted under standard access 
to information legislation. Summary of 
findings: 1) Access to Information laws 
increase responsiveness 2) Mute refusals are 
still a significant problem with 38% of 
requests made in countries with FOI laws 
going unanswered. 3) Regional variations 
exist 4) Civil society involvement helps 5) 
Discrimination affected response rates. 
Requesters participating in the study who 
were journalists or representatives of NGOs 
and who identified themselves as such when 
making their requests tended to receive 
responses more often than individuals who 
identified themselves as members of an 
excluded or vulnerable group 6) Results 
Inconsistent, Even in the Most Responsive 
Countries suggesting a lack of training of 
government officials  
Jenkins, R. (2007) 
‘India’s Unlikely 
Democracy: Civil 
Society versus 
Corruption.’ 
Journal of 
Democracy 18(2): 
55-69. 
India  Client 
Power 
1) Improved 
information             
Freedom of 
Information 
laws 
Civil societies 
(like MKSS) 
spearheaded 
movement 
leading to RTI 
Act. 
Qualitativ
e 
Reduced 
corruption 
The Right to 
information 
campaign in 
India led to new 
legislation and 
widely 
mobilised 
constituencies 
to use 
information for 
developmental 
purposes. 
This paper provides a historical overview of 
the two anti-corruption waves in India during 
the 90s and 2000s. It describes the concerted 
political and civil society efforts that led up 
to the 2003 Right to Information Act in an 
effort to reduce corruption in government 
programs targeted to the poor.  
Kwaja, Asim Ijaz. 
(2001), 'Can good 
projects succeed in 
Bad Communities? 
Collective Action in 
the Himalayas', 
Harvard 
University, 
Department of 
Economics , 
Cambridge, Mass 
India 
Compact, 
Client 
Power 
Community 
Participation 
(CDD) 
Citizens are 
involved in 
prioritizing 
and planning 
the delivery 
of public 
goods  
  
Quantitati
ve (fixed 
effects, 
with IV) 
Public 
good 
provision 
Community-
managed 
projects are 
better 
maintained than 
projects 
managed by the 
local 
government. 
Also, 
community 
participation in 
tehchnical 
decisions 
reduced the 
quality of 
maintenance, 
whereas 
community 
The lack of “social capital” is increasingly 
forwarded as an explanation for why 
communities perform poorly. Yet, to what 
extent can these community-specific 
constraints be compensated? I address this 
question by examining determinants  of 
collective success in a costly problem in 
developing economies - the upkeep of local 
public goods. A difficulty is obtaining 
reliable outcome measures for comparable 
collective tasks across well-defined 
communities. In order to resolve this I 
conduct detailed surveys of community-
maintained infrastructure projects in 
Northern Pakistan. The findings show that 
while community-specific constraints do 
matter, they can be compensated by better 
project design. Inequality, social 
fragmentation, and lack of leadership in the participation in 
non-technical 
decisions 
significantly 
improved 
maintenance.  
community do have adverse consequences 
but these can be overcome by changes in 
project complexity, community participation 
and return distribution. Using community 
fixed effects and instrumental variables 
offers a significant improvement in empirical 
identification over previous studies. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that better 
design matters even more for communities 
with poorer attributes. Projects can be 
designed to succeed even in “bad” 
communities. 
Mansuri, G. and V. 
Rao, 
―Community-
Based and –Driven 
Development: A 
Critical Review,‖ 
The World Bank 
Research Observer, 
19:1(2004), 1-39. 
Various / 
lit review 
Compact, 
Client 
Power, 
Politics 
Community 
Participation 
(CDD) 
Citizens are 
involved in 
prioritizing 
and planning 
the delivery 
of public 
goods  
     
Public 
good 
provision 
The review 
reveals lack of 
rigorous 
evaluations of 
the CDD 
approach and 
the few rigorous 
evaluations 
(with the except 
of the above 
study by Asim 
Kwaja), reveal 
that CDD is 
ineffective in 
most cases and 
the success 
depends largely 
on the ability of 
implementers to 
'contextualize'. 
Therefore, the 
author 
condones 
wholesale 
application of 
best practices. 
Community-based and driven development 
projects have become an important  form of 
development assistance, with the World 
Bank’s portfolio alone approximating $7 
billion. A review of their conceptual 
foundations and evidence on their 
effectiveness shows that projects rely on 
community participation have not been 
particularly effective at targeting the poor. 
There is some evidence that such projects 
create effective community infrastructure but 
not a single study establishes causal 
relationship between any outcome and 
participatory elements of a community-based 
development project. Most such projects are 
dominated by elites, and both targeting and 
project quality tend to be markedly worse in 
more unequal communities. A distinction 
between potentially ‘benevolent’ forms of 
elite domination and more pernicious types 
of capture is likely to be important for 
understanding project dynamics and 
outcomes. Several qualitative studies indicate 
that the sustainability of community-based 
initiatives depends crucially on an enabling 
institutional environment, which requires 
government commitment, and on 
accountability of leaders to their community 
to avoid ‘supply-driven demand driven 
development. External agents strongly 
influence project success, but facilitators are 
often poorly trained, particularly in rapidly 
scaled-up programs. The naïve application of 
complex contextual concepts like 
participation, social capital, and 
empowerment is endemic among project 
implementers and contributes to poor design 
and implementation. The evidence suggests that community-based and –driven 
development projects are best undertaken in 
a context-specific manner, with a long time 
horizon and with careful and well-designed 
monitoring and evaluation systems. 
Wantcheckon L. 
(2002), 
"Clientelism and 
Voting Behavior: A 
field Experiment in 
Benin", New York 
University 
Benin   Politics  n/a  n/a  n/a  RCT    
The results 
indicate that 
women voters 
have stronger 
preference for 
public goods 
than men, and 
that younger 
and older voters 
have similar 
policy 
preferences 
I conducted a field experiment in Benin to 
investigate the impact of clientelism on 
voting behavior. In collaboration with four 
political parties involved in the 2001 
presidential elections, clientelist and 
programmatic platforms were designed and 
run in twenty randomly selected villages of 
an average of 756 registered voters. Even 
after controlling for ethnic affiliation, I find 
that clientelist platforms have significant 
effect on voting behavior. The effect was 
strongest for incumbent and for “local” 
candidates. The evidence indicates that 
“national” candidates have comparative 
advantage over “local” candidates on 
programme. In addition, the less clientelist is 
the platform of the “national” opposition 
candidate, the better is his electoral prospect 
among female voters. 
Khemani, S and 
Kheefer, P "The 
Role of Mass 
Media in 
Developing 
Democracies:Impa
ct of Radio on the 
Distribution of 
Anti-malaria Bed 
Nets in Benin", 
World Bank Draft 
(May 2011) 
Benin  
Compact, 
Client 
Power. 
Politics 
1) Improved 
information             
Radios 
disseminate 
information 
on the 
availabitliy of 
free bed nets 
and of their 
importance in 
reducing the 
contraction 
and spread of 
Malaria  
It is usually 
hypothesized 
that increased 
information 
could improve 
collective 
action capacity 
of clients to 
increase 
government 
accountability.  
Natural 
Experime
nt - 
Exploiting 
quasi-
random 
radio 
coverage 
within 
commune 
Public 
good 
provision 
Increased 
information 
resulted in an 
greater usage of 
bed nets. 
However, this 
was the result 
of individual 
households 
investing more 
of their own 
resources in 
acquiring bed 
nets as opposed 
to higher levels 
of provision of 
free bed nets by 
government 
Government provision of free or subsidized 
bed nets to combat malaria in Africa is an 
important policy context to examine 
unanswered questions regarding the 
influence of mass media on household 
political behavior and health practices in 
poor democracies. Does radio access enable 
citizens to receive greater private benefits 
from government programs (in this case, free 
bed nets), as it does in richer countries? Does 
it persuade households to invest more of their 
own resources to acquire bed nets? Using a 
“natural experiment” in radio markets in 
northern Benin, which provide for exogenous 
variation in village access to community 
radio, we find that households in villages 
with greater radio access are more likely to 
acquire bed nets using their own resources; 
they are not more likely to receive them for 
free from government sources. This 
evidence, consistent with other evidence on 
education in Benin, suggests that in poor 
democracies mass media are more likely to 
be persuasive in changing the private 
behavior of poor citizens—in this case, to invest more of their own resources on a good 
with large positive externalities (bed nets)—
rather than enabling  citizens to extract 
greater benefits from government. 
Khemani, S and 
Kheefer, P "When 
Do Legislators 
Pass on Pork? The 
Role of Political 
Parties in 
Determining 
Legislator Effort", 
American Political 
Science Review, 
Vol. 103, No. 1 
India  Compact 
1) Compact 
between 
party leaders 
and 
legislators is 
linked to 
level of 
party 
attachement 
in the 
legislator's 
constituency 
Through 
seleciton of 
legislators 
with the 
correct 
preferences  
n/a  Quantitati
ve 
Public 
good 
provision 
In areas where 
voters display 
strong 
attachement to 
party, 
legislators exert 
lower effort in 
using their 
discretionary 
funds to 
implement 
projects. The 
authors 
interpret this 
finding as an 
indication that 
party leaders 
can afford to 
select 
legislators 
whose 
preferences are 
more aligned to 
party 
preferences 
rather than 
concerned with 
their 
constituents in 
those areas 
where there is 
strong party 
attachment.  
A central challenge in political economy is to 
identify the conditions under which 
legislators seek 
to “bring home the pork” to constituents. We 
conduct the first systematic analysis of one 
determinant 
of constituency service, voter attachment to 
political parties, holding constant electoral 
and political institutions. Our analysis takes 
advantage of data from a unique type of 
public spending 
program that is proliferating across 
developing countries, the constituency 
development fund (CDF), 
which offers more precise measures of 
legislator effort than are common in the 
literature. Examining 
the CDF in India, we find that legislator 
effort is significantly lower in constituencies 
that are party 
strongholds. This result, which is robust to 
controls for alternate explanations, implies 
that legislators 
pass on pork when voters are more attached 
to political parties. It has implications not 
only for understanding 
political incentives and the dynamics of party 
formation, but also for evaluating the impact 
of 
CDFs. Khemani, S and 
Kheefer, P "Mass 
Media and Public 
Services: The 
Effects of Radio 
Access on Public 
Education in 
Benin", World 
Bank Policy 
Research Working 
Paper, WPS5559 
Benin  
Compact, 
Client 
Power, 
Politics 
1) Improved 
information             
Radios 
disseminate 
information 
on school 
infrastructure 
and 
educational 
services 
It is usually 
hypothesized 
that increased 
information 
could improve 
collective 
action capacity 
of clients to 
increase 
government 
accountability.  
Natural 
Experime
nt - 
Exploiting 
quasi-
random 
radio 
coverage 
within 
commune 
Public 
good 
provision 
Increased 
information 
resulted in an  
increase in 
access and 
usage of 
education 
facilities but the 
change came 
from changes in 
household 
behavior 
(greater demand 
for education) 
rather than 
better 
government 
accountability 
Does radio access improve public service 
provision? And if so, does it do so by 
increasing government accountability to 
citizens, or by persuading households to take 
advantage of publicly-provided services? 
Prior research has argued that citizens with 
greater access to mass media receive greater 
benefits from targeted government welfare 
programs, but has not addressed these 
questions for public services such as in 
education and health. Using unique data from 
Benin, this paper finds that literacy rates 
among school children are higher in villages 
exposed to signals from a larger number of 
community radio stations. The effect is 
identified based on a “natural experiment” in 
the northern communes of Benin where 
within-commune variation in village  access 
to radio stations is exogenous to observed 
and unobserved village characteristics. In 
contrast to prior research, the authors find 
that this media effect does not operate 
through government accountability: 
government inputs into village schools and 
household knowledge of government 
education policies are no different in villages 
with greater access to community radio. 
Instead, households with greater access are 
more likely to make financial investments in 
the education of their children. 
Schaffer, F 
"Disciplinary 
Reactions: 
Alienation and the 
Reform of Vote 
Buying in the 
Philippines", MIT 
2002 
Philippin
es  Politics 
1) 
Regulating 
the electoral 
system  
Implementing 
electoral 
reforms to 
fight vote-
buying 
   Qualitativ
e  n/a  
Theoretical 
conclusions 
described in 
abstract -->. 
The main take-
away is that 
electoral 
reforms that 
address vote-
buying can 
sometimes have 
unintended 
second-hang 
complications 
and costs that 
do not justify 
these reforms. 
Through the 
case study of 
the Philippines, 
This analysis has had to leave many 
important issues and questions unaddressed. 
With regard to the Philippine case alone, it 
has little to say about how rural voters view 
vote buying and efforts to reform it, or the 
distinctive contribution of upper class 
reformers to the misrepresentation of the 
urban poor. It has not discussed the views of 
vote-buying politicians, those who bankroll 
them, or members of the higher classes who 
distance themselves from reformist groups. 
Nor has this analysis delved into the question 
of whether vote buying is really a serious 
defect of the Philippine and Thai electoral 
systems, or whether efforts to discipline vote 
sellers reflect instead middle class fantasies 
and anxieties blown out of proportion. 
Callahan (2002, 24) goes so far as to argue 
that in Thailand “vote-buying is not as big a 
problem as is our obsession with it.” It could Schaffer shows 
the important of 
context in 
assessing the 
viability of such 
reforms.  
thus be asked why reformers in both 
countries have not tried to change more 
earnestly the deeper political and economic 
structures which have given rise to a host of 
extra-legal political practices, of which vote 
buying is but one. Or it might be asked why 
reformers have not focused more intensively 
on other, more clearly nefarious, practices 
such as the use of violence as an election 
strategy. In the May 2001 Philippine 
elections there were 100 election related 
deaths, with another 141 people wounded. 
When 76 people were killed and 26 injured 
in the 2002 barangay elections, the 
COMELEC chairman expressed satisfaction 
that it was “generally peaceful,” while the 
PPCRV charmain chairman described the 
violent incidents,-  which included 42 
shootings, 9 liquidations, 7 gunfights, 6 
ambushes, 3 cases of harassment, 3 strafings, 
3 abductions, and 2 bombings - as “isolated". 
Vincente, P (2010) 
"Is Vote-buying 
Effective? Evidence 
from a Field 
Experiment in West 
Africa" , Oxford 
University and 
BREAD 
Sao 
Tome 
and 
Principe 
Politics  1) Improved 
information             
Improving 
information 
on the legal 
structure of 
the electoral 
system, 
namely, on 
the illegal 
nature of 
vote-buying 
Voters attended 
voter education 
campaign 
organized by 
the National 
Electoral 
Commission 
RCT  Electoral 
outcomes 
Improved 
information on 
illegality on 
vote-buying 
reduced the 
influence of 
money on 
outcomes 
(although we 
are not sure 
whether the 
information 
itself or rather 
the perception 
of greater 
monitoring by 
the electoral 
commission is 
driving the 
result) and 
favored the 
incumbent 
Vote-buying, i.e., cash-for-votes, is a 
frequent practice during election time in 
many parts of the world, namely in West 
Africa. However, in the presence of secret 
ballots, it is not clear whether vote-buying 
drives voting behavior. In order to infer 
effects of vote-buying on electoral behavior, 
we designed and conducted a randomized 
field experiment during an election in newly 
oil-rich Sao Tome and Principe. We follow a 
voter education campaign against votebuying 
sponsored by the Electoral Commission, 
using panel-survey measurements as well as 
actual electoral data per ballot station. Our 
results show that the campaign reduced the 
influence of money offered on voting, 
decreased electoral participation, and favored 
the incumbent. This evidence suggests that 
vote-buying increases voter turnout and that 
the challenger drives relatively more votes 
through vote-buying - i.e., vote-buying 
counteracts the incumbency advantage. Pande, R (2011) 
"Can Informed 
Voters Enforce 
Better 
Governance? 
Experiments in 
Low Income 
Democracies", 
Annual Review of 
Economics 
India  Politics  1) Improved 
information             
1) Providing 
information 
on politician's 
performance 
and 
characteristic
sand 
exposing 
voters to 
politicians 
from under-
represented 
groups              
2) Educating 
voters about 
importance of 
politics and 
the potential 
costs of 
electoral 
malpractice 
and identity 
politics 
NGOs and civil 
societies 
organize 
awareness 
campaigns to 
educate and 
inform voters 
RCT  Electoral 
outcomes 
Better-
performing 
politicians are 
elected and 
there is a 
decrease in the 
extent of 
electoral 
malpractice and 
the level of 
identity politics 
(caste) 
This article evaluates a body of recent work 
which uses field and natural experiments to 
answer this question. A common finding in 
the literature is that voter behavior is 
malleable and that information about the 
political process and politician performance 
improves electoral accountability. Limited 
availability of information thus provides one 
explanation for the persistence of low quality 
politicians and the existence of identity 
politics and electoral malpractices in low-
income democracies. Understanding how 
voters can gain access to credible sources of 
information and how politicians react to 
improved information about their 
performance are promising avenues for 
future research. 
Banerjee, A, 
Green, D & Pande, 
R "Can Voters be 
Primed to Choose 
Better Legislators? 
Experimental 
Evidence from 
Rural India", 
Preliminary and 
Incomplete 
India  Politics  1) Improved 
information             
2 voter 
awareness 
campaigns to 
priming 
voters to not 
vote for 
corrupt 
candidates 
and to not 
vote for 
candidates 
based only on 
caste 
2 prominent 
NGOs 
organized 
awareness 
campaigns to 
educate and 
inform voters 
RCT  Electoral 
outcomes 
Ethnic 
preferences can 
be altered by 
disseminating 
information on 
the quality of 
politicians, 
providing a 
means to move 
away from 
identity politics 
and also select 
better and less 
corrupt 
politicians 
Ethnic politics and political corruption are 
important concerns in many developing 
country democracies. We conducted  eld 
experiments in rural India to examine the 
responsiveness of voter preferences to 
priming about the relevance of ethnicity and 
politician quality for service delivery. We 
used vignette experiments to examine how 
voter preferences vary with information 
about politician quality. We  nd strong 
evidence that ethnic preferences are 
malleable. The vignette experiments show 
that ethnic preferences respond to politician 
quality and the field experiment shows that 
reductions in ethnic voting reduce the vote 
share of criminal politicians. In contrast, 
priming voters on the relevance of corruption 
left electoral outcomes una ected (in the field 
experiment). We interpret these results in the 
context of a model where a voter's use of 
specific evaluative criteria is influenced by 
available information. Ferraz, C and 
Finan, F 
"Reelection 
Incentives and 
Political 
Corruption:Eviden
ce from Brazilian 
Audit Reports", 
2005 Annual 
meeting, July 24-
27, Providence, RI, 
American 
Agricultural 
Economics 
Association (New 
Name 2008: 
Agricultural and 
Applied Economics 
Association) 
Brazil  Politics 
This paper uses audit data from Brazil to test political agency 
models on corruption that predict that 2nd and 3rd term 
politicians will tend to be more corrupt than 1st term 
politician. Their unique dataset confirms the model's 
predictions.  
Electoral 
outcomes 
Re-election 
incentives can 
influence the 
level of 
corruption in 
politicians.  
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, 
the Brazilian government began to audit the 
municipal expenditure of federally-
transferred funds. Using these audit reports, 
we construct a unique data set of political 
corruption to test whether reelection 
incentives affect the level of corruption in a 
municipality. Consistent with a political 
economy agency model, we find that mayors 
who are in their second and final term are 
significantly more corrupt than first-term 
mayors. In particular, second-term mayors on 
average divert, R$188,431.4 more than first-
term mayors, which is approximately 4 
percent of the total amount transferred to 
municipalities. We also find much more 
pronounced effects among municipalities 
where the costs of rent-extraction are lower, 
and the density of pivotal voters is higher. 
Our results also illustrate an important trade-
off: second-term mayors, while more corrupt, 
provide a higher level of public goods. As 
Brazil and other countries continue their 
decentralization process, our findings 
promote the need for a better understanding 
of how local institutions can help reduce the 
incentives for corruption. 
Bobonis, G, 
Fuertes, C, 
Schwabe, R  (2011) 
"The Dynamic 
Effects of 
Information on 
Political 
Corruption:Theory 
and Evidence from 
Puerto Rico", 
Working Papers 
from University of 
Toronto, 
Department of 
Economics  
Puerto 
Rico  Politics  1) Improved 
information             
Providing 
information 
on corruption 
level of 
politicians  
  
Naturally 
random 
auditing 
of 
municipali
ties 
Electoral 
outcomes 
While political 
agency models 
may predict that 
politicians who 
benefit whose 
reputation goes 
up will tend to 
exploit the 
'slack' they 
receive by 
seeking more 
rents in the 
future, the 
authors show 
that this is not 
the case. 
Corruption 
levels before 
and after the 
audit stay the 
same in audited 
areas 
Does the disclosure of information about 
corrupt activities induce a sustained 
reduction in corruption? We use publicly 
released routine audits of municipal 
governments in Puerto Rico to answer this 
question. We first develop a political agency 
model where voters re-elect incumbents 
based on their performance while in office. 
We show that, because voters cannot directly 
observe incumbents’ actions, an incumbent 
whose reputation improved in the previous 
term is likely to engage in more rent-seeking 
activities in a future term. Guided by this 
model, we use longitudinal data on audit 
results to examine the long-term 
consequences of providing information to 
voters on levels of political corruption. We 
find that municipal corruption levels in 
subsequent audits are on average the same in 
municipalities audited preceding the previous 
election and those not audited then. In spite 
of this, mayors in municipalities audited 
preceding the previous election have higher re-election rates, suggesting that audits 
enable voters to select more competent 
politicians. We conclude that short-term 
information dissemination policies do not 
necessarily align politicians’ long-term 
actions with voter preferences as politicians 
exploit their reputational gains by extracting 
more rents from office. 
 